Why nuclear intelligence is vital for Bangladesh
As Bangladesh prepares to begin commercial operation of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) in late 2025, the promise of cleaner, reliable baseload power is now closer to reality. Yet with this milestone comes a parallel responsibility: ensuring the highest standards of nuclear security. Nuclear security refers to the prevention, detection, and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, or any malicious act involving nuclear and other radioactive materials or related facilities from both external and internal adversaries. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) consistently underscores that the success of nuclear operations depends not only on technological excellence but also on resilient and adaptive security frameworks. Within this context, nuclear intelligence (NUCINT)—the collection, analysis, and interpretation of information related to nuclear and radiological threats—emerges as a cornerstone for safeguarding national security, peace, and stability.
Bangladesh is situated in a strategically sensitive region, bordered by nuclear-armed India and Pakistan and lying close to unstable Myanmar. The country's geographical position, porous borders, and expanding critical infrastructure make it vulnerable to nuclear smuggling, trafficking, sabotage, and insider threats. Nuclear intelligence serves as an invisible shield, providing early warnings about illicit activities and improving the country's ability to detect, assess, and respond to threats involving nuclear or radiological materials. For instance, integrating spectral data from handheld and portal detectors at border checkpoints can help identify radioactive anomalies in cargo, transforming isolated security measures into a proactive intelligence network.
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Nuclear security traditionally relied on the "3Gs"—guards, gates, and guns—focusing on a physical protection system. However, as technology has evolved, so have the threats. Modern security now includes cyber protection, nuclear intelligence, and insider threat mitigation. Today, adversaries do not only attack from outside; insiders with access or knowledge can cause equal or greater harm. Ideologically motivated adversaries (criminals or terrorists) may exploit vulnerabilities in transport, storage, or operational stages of nuclear material. External adversaries such as Al Qaeda or ISI have historically sought nuclear or radiological materials for malicious use, including the creation of "dirty bombs or nuclear weapons."
Thus, NUCINT bridges physical, cyber, and human dimensions of security. It uses tools such as gamma-ray spectroscopy to detect enriched uranium, neutron sensors to identify reactor anomalies, and AI-assisted analytics to flag abnormal behaviour. Deployed at key entry points—such as Chattogram or Mongla ports, where nuclear fuel enters the country—these systems transform isolated checkpoints into a national detection network.
International obligations and Bangladesh's commitments
Bangladesh's approach to nuclear intelligence is shaped by international laws and standards. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment obligate states to protect nuclear materials during storage, use, and transport. Complementary global conventions criminalise nuclear terrorism, terrorist bombing, and financing of terrorism. UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 obligate states to prevent non-state actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate on intelligence and law enforcement. Bangladesh adheres to these commitments and aligns with the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its import-export guidelines. Together, these instruments guide national policy, regulatory practices, and intelligence-sharing with the IAEA, Interpol, and UN bodies.
Bangladesh has strengthened its nuclear governance through several laws, including the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Act (2012), Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act (2006), Anti-Terrorism Act (Revised 2012) and its Rules (2013), and the Money Laundering Prevention Act (2012). These laws regulate nuclear materials, ensure safe transport, prevent financing of illicit activities, and empower authorities to investigate and prosecute nuclear-related crimes. Yet, without intelligence-led implementation, legal tools remain reactive rather than preventive.
A few past incidents underscore why nuclear intelligence is urgently needed. In 2003, four members of a banned militant outfit were arrested for attempting to smuggle 225 grams of uranium oxide near the Indian border—later traced to Kazakhstan—potentially usable in a "dirty bomb." In 2014, police in Dhaka seized a "uranium-like" substance along with a radiation meter and a gas mask. In 2017, radioactive material was detected in a container at Chittagong Port bound for China. In 2022, high-value electrical cables were stolen from RNPP cranes, allegedly involving insider knowledge.
These incidents may not represent major nuclear crises, but they reveal weaknesses in detection, coordination, and intelligence-sharing. They highlight the necessity of a national NUCINT system that links border security, law enforcement, regulatory bodies, and plant operators.
Policy and intelligence integration
Global cyber-attacks—such as cyber intrusions on Iranian nuclear facilities—have proven that nuclear security now extends beyond physical barriers. Digital systems that control reactors, cooling systems, and radiation monitoring devices can be targeted remotely. For Bangladesh, cyber-nuclear intelligence must be integrated into security planning to monitor network traffic, predict anomalies, and intercept malicious codes before they disrupt safety systems.
To institutionalise NUCINT, Bangladesh could consider establishing a nuclear intelligence cell under the National Security Intelligence (NSI). This unit should include experts in nuclear engineering, cybersecurity, law enforcement, radiation science, AI analytics, and emergency response. Recruitment must be merit-based and technically rigorous to maintain credibility and confidentiality.
The cell would act as a central coordination hub, linking the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority, Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited, security agencies, universities, customs, ports, coast guards, and the Prime Minister's Office. Its role would be collecting and analysing intelligence related to nuclear materials and threats; Facilitating real-time data sharing among stakeholders; Conducting risk assessments, tabletop exercises, and incident simulations; and coordinating with international bodies like the IAEA, Interpol, and Saarc regional platforms.
For Bangladesh to become a responsible nuclear state, several priorities are essential: integrate physical, cyber, and nuclear intelligence systems for real-time situational awareness; establish a national detection architecture with portal monitors, drones, mobile labs, and handheld devices at ports, airports, and border crossings; develop a nuclear forensics laboratory to trace intercepted materials and support criminal investigations; train specialised personnel in radiation detection, cyber defence, intelligence analysis, and crisis communication; enhance regional cooperation with India, China, and Saarc states and global partners like IAEA and Interpol to share best practices and intelligence.
Nuclear intelligence is not merely a technical tool or a silent report. It is the nervous system of nuclear governance and the country's sovereignty, built on integrity and sensitivity, and designed to turn invisible threats into actionable insights. As Bangladesh transitions from a nuclear newcomer to an operating nation, NUCINT must serve as its first and last line of defence. If Bangladesh institutionalises nuclear intelligence, strengthens communication among agencies, and develops knowledgeable human resources while upholding regional and international obligations, the country will emerge as a responsible nuclear nation. The atom must remain a symbol of peace, prosperity, and progress—not a source of risk or danger.
Dr Md Shafiqul Islam is professor at the Department of Nuclear Engineering at University of Dhaka, and former visiting professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), US. He can be reached at [email protected].
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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