Strategic autonomy has become a survival necessity for Bangladesh

For Bangladesh, the phrase "strategic autonomy" is no longer an abstract policy slogan—it is becoming a survival necessity. The country's economic structure, geographic realities, and political constraints form a tight web of dependencies that limit its ability to make fully independent choices. A closer look at the numbers shows the risks are not theoretical. They are real, measurable, and growing.

From a strategic standpoint, Bangladesh's position is shaped by the intersecting interests of major powers. The United States views the Bay of Bengal as a strategic node in its Indo-Pacific agenda, seeking closer defence and maritime cooperation. India, as the immediate neighbour with 4,096 kilometres of shared border, holds both leverage and overlapping security concerns, while China's deepening economic and infrastructure footprint, particularly through ports and energy projects, adds another layer of complexity. Russia, though less directly present, engages through defence sales and political alignment, while the EU's concern lies mainly in trade security and maritime stability, given its heavy import dependence on Bangladeshi goods. Other regional actors, including Japan and Australia, are also increasing engagement, recognising Bangladesh's strategic maritime location. This convergence of competing interests creates opportunities but also vulnerabilities, making autonomy increasingly urgent.

Bangladesh's economic base is alarmingly narrow. On the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, it scores 0.88—almost 10 times the developing-country average of 0.09. The RMG industry accounts for 80 percent of exports, when experts suggest no single sector should exceed 20 to 30 percent. With knitwear and woven garments included, textiles alone bring in over 85 percent of earnings. Buyers are equally concentrated: the EU, US, and UK take 70 percent of exports, well above the safe threshold of 50 percent designated for any one market or region. Such heavy reliance means that a downturn or policy change in these regions could shake the economy far more than it should.

Imports also deepen dependency. In 2024, China supplied 28.57 percent of imports—almost double the 15 percent safety limit economists recommend. In 2023, the trade deficit reached $20.42 billion, or 4.6 percent of GDP—four times the 1 percent sustainability benchmark. With India, the imbalance is stark, amounting to a $9.22 billion annual deficit that carries political weight.

Read more

What Bangladesh can learn from the Iran-Israel war

Financially, the weak spots are evident. Bangladesh attracts only about $3 billion in FDI a year—0.4 percent of GDP, well below the 2.5 percent benchmark and just a fraction of Vietnam's $39 billion. Remittances contribute $33 billion, or 6.03 percent of GDP—twice the safe 3 percent limit—making the economy exposed to shifts in host nations' policies. Geographically, Bangladesh shares 76 percent of its borders with India and depends on the sea for 93 percent of trade, leaving it vulnerable to regional naval influence.

Water disputes with India add another dimension of risk. The two countries share 54 rivers, but between 1997 and 2016, Bangladesh received less than its treaty-mandated share in 65 percent of critical dry periods. In March-May alone, India fell short in 39 of 60 cases. Under the Ganges Water Treaty, dry seasons in 2010 and 2016 saw 44 to 49 percent less water than agreed. These shortages have tangible effects, reducing 20 percent of fisheries income and undermining about 5 percent of GDP linked to sea-based activities.

Maritime security is equally weak. With nearly all trade conducted by sea, the vulnerability is stark. Over a recent five-year period, 411 fishermen were killed and 1,000 were injured by maritime criminals. Defence spending is just 1.4 percent of GDP, well below the regional average of 2.5 percent, leaving significant gaps in deterrence and rapid response.

Looking across the indicators, Bangladesh scores only 2 out of 10 in economic diversification, when at least 7 is needed. Its top 20 products make up 80 percent of exports, compared to 37 to 59 percent for countries such as China, India, and Vietnam. Energy dependency is another glaring weakness—80 percent of energy is imported, with security metrics rating the country at 2 out of 10. Diplomatic flexibility stands at 5 out of 10, against a target of 8, while institutional capacity for independent decision-making is just 3 out of 10, where 7 is desired. Trade diversification scores 4 out of 10, but should be at 7. On average, Bangladesh records a strategic autonomy gap of only 3.7 out of 10.

The cost of dependence is already high. The trade deficit drains reserves, while heavy export concentration increases volatility during global downturns, especially given reliance on garments. Political leverage tilts away from Dhaka as water disputes undermine agriculture and energy imports limit industrial flexibility. The imbalance with India also serves as a potential bargaining tool in bilateral negotiations. Security risks are equally acute: maritime reliance makes almost all trade vulnerable, and porous land borders combined with underfunded defence capacity create layered challenges that affect stability.

Credible analyses underline these risks. UNCTAD and the Harvard Growth Lab point to economic concentration, SIPRI highlights dependence on foreign defence supplies, the IEA and IEEFA stress imported energy reliance, while UN Comtrade and OEC reveal limited trade breadth. Studies from Springer and the Atlantic Council describe cautious multi-vector diplomacy that restricts policy manoeuvrability.

Regional examples show that alternatives exist. Vietnam once faced a similar over-reliance but broke out by diversifying exports and drawing in large volumes of FDI. Singapore, despite its small size and lack of resources, secured autonomy through trade diversification and strong diplomatic networks. South Korea transformed from an aid recipient into an industrial power with independent decision-making capacity.

The broader picture for Bangladesh is troubling: notable economic fragility, significant geopolitical pressures, and a clear shortfall in strategic independence—hardly the profile of a nation fully steering its own course. Strategic autonomy, in this context, is not a lofty ideal but a necessity. It is about avoiding situations where external forces—whether markets, neighbouring governments, or supply chain disruptions—can dictate national outcomes. It means loosening the chokehold of export and import concentration, strengthening institutions to make independent decisions, and ensuring defence and energy security.

The urgency lies in the compound nature of the risks. An economic shock could coincide with a water dispute, or a maritime security crisis could erupt alongside an export downturn. For Bangladesh, the question is not whether to pursue strategic autonomy but how quickly it can achieve it. The data, in all its unforgiving precision, points to the same conclusion: dependence already comes at a high price, and the cost will only rise if the country delays transformation.

Alauddin Mohammad is joint member secretary of National Citizen Party (NCP) and executive director at Institute of Policy, Governance and Development (IPGAD).

Views expressed in this article are the author's own.

Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.