Ports for private profit or national progress?
Bangladesh's port privatisation debate has entered a decisive phase as global operators express strong interest in managing the New Mooring Container Terminal (NCT), the under-construction Matarbari Deep-Sea Port, and the proposed Bay Terminal. Supporters view this as an opportunity to enhance efficiency, attract technology and capital, and integrate Bangladesh into global logistics chains. But critics warn that premature concessions without a robust governance framework could jeopardise economic sovereignty, transparency, and control over critical infrastructure.
The NCT, built in 2007 at a cost of nearly Tk 2,000 crore, remains Chattogram port's most profitable facility, handling over 40 percent of container throughput and generating steady revenue for the Chittagong Port Authority (CPA). Despite the record, the government's plan to lease NCT to a foreign operator has sparked widespread concern. Originally designed for a landlord-model concession, NCT's operation was assumed locally after the 2007-08 political transition. The CPA later self-funded ten ship-to-shore cranes and proved that domestic expertise can deliver competitive results. Some stakeholders question why such a high-performing terminal must now be handed over when inefficiencies stem largely from customs clearance delays, channel depth, and inland connectivity, rather than port-yard operations.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. In this regard, it should be mentioned that following a writ petition challenging the legality of NCT management handover to a foreign operator, the High Court on July 30 issued a rule asking why the handover process should not be declared illegal, and why fair and competitive public bidding should not be ensured before appointing any operator. However, despite the writ being pending, the government has reportedly continued the process of the planned handover.
Internationally, port reforms succeed when sequencing and regulation are right. Governments typically invite foreign operators to develop greenfield terminals, demanding heavy capital, not to take over running and revenue-earning assets. Malaysia's Port of Tanjung Pelepas and India's Jawaharlal Nehru Port illustrate that privatisation works only within transparent regulatory frameworks. As Dr Peter de Langen, during a class at Erasmus University Rotterdam that I attended, noted, sustainable maritime reform requires political consensus, clear concession law, and an enforceable competition policy.
India's example also offers a lesson here. After allowing private operators in major ports, India enacted a competition law specifically covering port concessions to prevent monopolistic control by a few global terminal operators. No single company is allowed to operate adjacent terminals within the same port complex, ensuring competitive pricing and performance. Bangladesh, however, lacks such protection. Without a competition act tailored to terminal operation, a dominant foreign operator could gain excessive leverage over tariff setting, berth allocation, and even cargo prioritisation, undermining both fair trade and national interest.
The Matarbari Deep-Sea Port, financed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), is the country's most strategic maritime investment. CPA has already spent a considerable amount developing its access channel and related infrastructure. Yet, even before Matarbari begins operation, the government has advanced the World Bank-supported Bay Terminal Marine Infrastructure Project. Experts fear that parallel megaprojects, planned without coordination of dredging depth, hinterland connectivity, and cargo forecasts, could lead to duplication and under-utilisation. Bangladesh must prioritise a unified national port master plan integrating Matarbari, Bay Terminal, and Chattogram port under one logistics vision rather than allowing overlapping concessions driven by external financiers.
The CPA's recent tariff hike—reportedly advised by the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—has added fuel to the controversy. While pricing reforms are necessary, the rationale should reflect service efficiency and local competitiveness, not investor appetite. Tariffs must be linked to measurable service-delivery benchmarks such as berth productivity, crane moves per hour, and ship turnaround time. Without those, rate increases risk burdening exporters and importers without improving performance.
A more balanced framework is therefore urgently required. Bangladesh needs a comprehensive port reform act to define concession models, competition rules, and accountability mechanisms. This should include mandatory disclosure of concession contracts, an independent tariff-setting authority, and periodic performance audits. Such measures are not barriers to private investment—they are the very foundations of credibility.
Privatisation should serve as a means to modernisation, not an end pursued for short-term fiscal or political gains. Global partnerships can help upgrade equipment, digital systems, and logistics know-how—but only within a framework where national interest remains non-negotiable. Technology transfer clauses must be explicit, requiring foreign operators to train Bangladeshi professionals and share operational software and maintenance know-how.
Employment provisions have to secure local jobs rather than displacing CPA's skilled workforce, while performance bonds and KPI-based bonuses or penalties should ensure consistent standards. Moreover, oversight must evolve from passive supervision to active regulation. An independent national logistics commission could monitor concession compliance, publish benchmarking reports, and prevent conflicts of interest, along with its other responsibilities.
However, Bangladesh should not view foreign operators as adversaries. Global firms such as DP World, PSA International, or Hutchison Ports bring advanced automation, larger ship-handling capacity, and international connectivity networks. Their participation can accelerate Bangladesh's aspiration to become a South Asian logistics hub. But partnerships must remain transparent, time-bound, and reciprocal. Concession durations should be reasonable, revenue-sharing clearly defined, and mid-term reviews built into every agreement. Contracts must be published online, and citizen access to key performance data must be guaranteed.
The challenge lies not in whether Bangladesh should privatise but in how and when. If reforms proceed without governance, competition law, and regulatory oversight, the nation risks surrendering strategic control. Conversely, if Bangladesh builds institutions first, then invites global players under fair rules, the result can be transformative. Efficiency, innovation, and private investment would then complement—not compromise—sovereignty.
Ultimately, ports are not mere commercial assets; they are extensions of national territory and instruments of trade diplomacy. Chattogram, Matarbari, and the Bay Terminal can together redefine Bangladesh's role in regional supply chains. Privatisation should align with a long-term maritime strategy that protects the public purse, nurtures domestic competence, and welcomes global expertise on Bangladesh's terms.
If done right, Bangladesh can create a model of public-private partnership rooted in accountability and competition—one that mirrors global best practice while defending its own economic sovereignty. If done wrong, it risks replacing state inefficiency with private monopoly. The choice is ours.
Ahamedul Karim Chowdhury is adjunct faculty at Bangladesh Maritime University, and former head of inland container depot at Kamalapur and Pangaon Inland Container Terminal under Chittagong Port Authority.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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