Resolving the Rohingya crisis: Does Bangladesh need to shift gear?
Recent developments in Myanmar, tensions at the Bangladesh-Myanmar and Bangladesh-India borders, and even the return of Donald Trump as president in the US have dramatically affected geopolitics in the South Asian region. While 64,718 Rohingya entered Bangladesh in 2024, according to the foreign ministry, and they continue to enter Bangladesh in small groups every day, according to the Rohingya living in the camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh needs to shift gear from talking about repatriation and start focusing on finding ways to stop the influx.
Based on the recent domestic political changes in Bangladesh, as well as the global changes, some questions arise in this regard. For one, when there is no instance of strict border closure in the past, can we hope that Bangladesh will be able to stop the (ir)regular small- and large-scale influxes of the Rohingya people? Also, since the country has not been able to successfully repatriate the Rohingya after the 2017 exodus, is it considering better alternatives to repatriation? While the foreign ministry considers the Arakan Army (AA) as a "non-state actor," Bangladesh has, on occasions, been in contact with the AA. Has the government done enough homework on how to engage with the AA, if necessary?
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The Awami League government did not focus on formulating the country's own legal instruments, such as a national policy, regarding the Rohingya issue. What about the interim government? Has it started developing a national refugee policy or a national policy for the Rohingya? With the emergence of "Arakan" in Rakhine, now controlled by the Arakan Army, have all the stakeholders in Bangladesh reached a consensus on what strategies to adopt to deal with the situation? Indeed, questions abound. However, at present, it is important to understand the motives and motivations of the AA.
Strangely, a fake message claiming AA asked Bangladesh for help was circulated by some individuals without realising the damages it might cause. Some speculate that the supply chain for AA's daily essentials may be linked to Bangladesh. The Myanmar junta may cut the internal supply chain anytime. Relying completely on India for a long time is surely not prudent because of the costs involved with it. This may make AA somewhat dependent on Bangladesh. Yet, because of their strength in arms and planning, they have reasons to create a fearful and threatening environment at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, which is now under their control.
But at the same time, it is necessary to have experts and others study the nature of AA and its background characteristics to deal with them.
Let's consider the AA's statement, "We recognise the human rights and citizen rights of the Rohingyas" (by Maj Gen Twan Mrat Naing). It may seem quite promising, but the fact is, in less than three years after making this statement in an interview with Bangladeshi journalists, they appeared before the Rohingya people in Rakhine as an equally brutal entity as the Tatmadaw. As a result, the 2024 influx took place.
Despite the negative sides, AA knows that it may have to rely on Bangladesh to maintain the supply chain for their survival. In the past, Bangladesh failed to seize this opportunity to start negotiations on the Rohingya issue. Will it now leap into action, or keep waiting for "the right time" to raise the issue? Realistically, there is no such thing as "the right time" when it comes to the situation of refugees like the Rohingya. It is all about protecting the human rights of over a million stateless people and saving Bangladesh from irreparable social, economic, and environmental damage.
It is not difficult to understand that the Rohingya issue may destabilise the entire region of South Asia. This is known to the global community as well. But we must remember, all superpowers, no matter how friendly they are with Bangladesh, have their investments in Myanmar. China and India have their own geopolitical and geo-economic interests in Rakhine, which dictate their policies for the region. Regional platforms may also remain passive. And the UN has so far been ineffective at doing anything to help Bangladesh resolve the crisis. So what other options are available to us?
There does not seem to be any practical alternative to meeting the AA with a strategic agenda. Engaging with a non-state actor is not an endorsement. And engaging with the AA may not even be enough to break the stalemate. It alone does not guarantee success. Engaging with other national, regional, and international actors simultaneously is necessary to bring the AA to the negotiating table.
Dr Ishrat Zakia Sultana is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University (NSU).
Dr Sk Tawfique M Haque is professor and Director of the South Asian Institute of Policy of Governance (SIPG) at NSU.
Views expressed in this article are the authors' own.
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