Bangladesh must hold its own amid changing geopolitics

The performative presence of two superpowers in the precincts of Bangladesh’s national parliament has added some twists in the country’s political plot. Last year, hundreds of drones illuminated the sky over Manik Mia Avenue to celebrate the July uprising and the Sino-Bangla friendship. Then, last week, a US military band performed at the same venue, remembering American architect Louis I Kahn, who designed the parliament complex. The celebration of America Week 2026 coincided with the formation of an American caucus in Bangladesh’s parliament. The pronounced exercises in cultural diplomacy, however, cannot be separated from geopolitics.

The parliament complex, irrespective of its designer or inception date, unequivocally belongs to Bangladesh. Yet, we allowed external powers to enter our national narrative through spectacular technology and/or political symbolism there. Their interest in the symbolic site prompts us to rethink different micro-narratives connected to our national narrative.

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Understanding these stories requires referencing the newly proposed Bangladesh-China-Myanmar economic corridor and Dhaka’s reciprocal trade agreement with Washington. On paper, the return to the idea of an economic corridor connecting Bangladesh with Yunnan through Myanmar is an overdue expression of the country’s “Look East” policy that promises greater access to China and Southeast Asia and modernised ports and multimodal transport to take full advantage of our geographical location. But the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed by the interim government with the US has certain provisions about digital trade, technology, border measures, supply chains, procurement, and Bangladesh’s commercial relations with other countries that prompt us to read the tri-national corridor and the US treaty together. The real challenge for Bangladesh is to participate in the proposed economic corridor without narrowing its access to the US market or compromising its economic choices due to external factors. This will be a test of our strategic autonomy.

The corridor outlined by China after our premier’s state visit connects Bangladesh with the Yunnan province through Myanmar. The connectivity entails development of various manufacturing and export processing zones that may help Bangladesh diversify its economy beyond RMG exports and remittances. A commercially viable connection to Yunnan could boost support logistics, agro-processing, tourism, light engineering, warehousing, and regional value chains.

However, the Myanmar question presents a major obstacle. Any corridor to Yunnan must traverse the conflict-ridden Rakhine state, a region marked by civil war, the expulsion of Rohingya Muslims, and significant Chinese and Indian strategic investments. China already has a China-Myanmar economic corridor that connects them with the proposed deep-sea port and special economic zone at Kyaukphyu in Rakhine. India, meanwhile, has invested in the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project. Kaladan employs Sittwe Port to link Mizoram with Kolkata, reducing its dependency on the narrow Siliguri Corridor. Both India and China maintain pragmatic relations with the Myanmar authorities as well as with the ethnic armed organisations. Washington views the corridor as the Chinese ambition of expanding its presence between the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The theatre that we are witnessing is thus becoming increasingly crowded.

Bangladesh needs to learn from the BCIM initiative and the consequences of geopolitical rivalry. The project had a premature demise as strategic suspicion displaced economic cooperation. India was uncomfortable seeing the corridor as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The new trilateral proposal excludes India, which has reasons to be sensitive about its vulnerable northeast. Dhaka should take New Delhi’s security concerns into account while remaining focused on avoiding India’s veto over legitimate connectivity decisions. A Bangladesh-first policy must highlight the corridor as commercially defensible, not a geopolitical trigger directed at New Delhi. Strategic autonomy requires the ability to work with both countries while becoming dependent on neither.

The situation is made more complicated by the US trade deal signed on February 9, which lets the US charge a 19 percent tariff on most Bangladeshi goods but also allows certain amounts of RMG and textile products to be imported without tariffs if they are connected to American cotton and man-made fibres. These conditions also permit agricultural, industrial, energy and technology products to enter the US market as the largest single-country export market. But the treaty reportedly restricts Bangladesh from economic dealings with third countries. Washington could interpret the proposed corridor as a violation of the treaty.

Bangladesh, therefore, needs to come up with its narrative where it could benefit from both. It could import American cotton, use Chinese machinery, manufacture RMG products in Bangladesh, and export them to several markets. But such an outcome will be possible only if neither side is allowed to impose exclusivity.

The danger is that the US may use market access to influence Bangladesh’s relations with China, while China may use infrastructure dependency to shape Bangladesh’s strategic pressures, but Bangladesh must learn to avert this dual vulnerability trap.

The weakest link in the corridor’s ambition is Myanmar. A treaty signed with Myanmar’s central government may not necessarily provide safe passage to ASEAN goods. India’s Kaladan project faces similar difficulties because the route crosses conflict-affected territory. This is where China can exert its influence to protect the infrastructure interests. But that could also imply Bangladesh becoming dependent upon Chinese mediation for the security of a route located in a third country. Such dependency is a serious sovereignty concern.

At the same time, the issue of the Rohingya refugees remains unresolved. We must address the unresolved issue of the Rohingya repatriation before any corridor is planned. More than 12 lakh Rohingya remain displaced in Bangladesh because Myanmar denied them citizenship and provision to return to their homeland with safety and dignity. Bangladesh cannot treat Rakhine as an economic corridor while accepting its closure as a homeland for the Rohingya.

So the government’s “Bangladesh first” position must use the corridor as leverage. It needs to convince China to be more active as a mediator for Rohingya repatriation. Bangladesh can learn from India as to how it prioritised its relations with the Myanmar authorities for different strategic projects. The corridor framework must not be separated from measurable commitments concerning humanitarian access, the security and citizenship rights of the Rohingya as well as their return. Connectivity cannot become a reward for Myanmar’s continued refusal to ignore the displacement of its people.

To return to the two performances on the parliament premises, we must reflect on the struggle for narrative influence now unfolding around Bangladesh. There is nothing wrong with connecting our story with those from the larger worlds. However, we should not let such cultural presence be mistaken for a strategic entitlement. The parliament belongs to the people of Bangladesh. The decisions made within the parliament must also reflect this principle.

Bangladesh needs the American market. It needs Chinese trade, investment and infrastructure. It needs workable relations with India, whose territory surrounds most of our land border. It needs peace in Myanmar and stability in the Bay of Bengal. The national interest lies not in choosing one relationship against the others but in preventing any relationship from closing off the rest.

Dr Shamsad Mortuza is vice-chancellor at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB).

Views expressed in this article are the author's own. 

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