Why the State doesn’t define good and evil

By the time you finish reading this introduction, a law will have been passed somewhere in the world that is technically legal but fundamentally unjust. For instance, if a bill mandating the execution of anyone who spits in a public space were to pass through the Bangladeshi Parliament, it would legally constitute a law, but it would be universally condemned as morally vicious. This leads us to understand interactions between law and morality.

The first question to arise is that: “What is morality?” In short, morality is a set of objective and universal rules, that I believe, originate from the “Divine Good”, and are pre-installed in human beings, that can sometimes be rationally discovered. Killing an innocent person, raping someone, or stealing someone’s possessions is objectively and morally wrong. Now the question is: what is objective morality? I will not use sophisticated academic jargons. Rather, to be quite plain and simple: objective morality implies moral truths which are true regardless of the presence of moral agents (i.e. human beings). In other words, moral truths are true just as two plus two equals four is true, regardless of whether mathematicians exist or not. A simpler illustration: “I like strawberry ice cream” may be a subjectively true statement. However, “ice cream melts in heat” is objectively true. Likewise, killing an innocent person is objectively morally wrong, even if the entire world subjectively agrees that it is not.

Consensus does not equate moral truth, just as “two plus two equals four” will never be false even if the entire world says it is.

The most logical follow-up is the question: “How can a moral claim not be true if everyone agrees with it?” The answer is that a claim’s truth being contingent on agreement makes morality subjective. If the bar is consensus among people, then morality is barely an opinion: it is just a modified “we like strawberry ice cream”. This question can be answered from two different perspectives. First, consensus does not equate moral truth, just as “two plus two equals four” will never be false even if the entire world says it is. Second, if consensus were held necessary for an action to be morally right or wrong, then Nazi Germany could never be condemned for its actions, as the German society of the time reached a consensus that the holocaust was not wrong. Similarly, Israel could not be vilified for the genocide committed in Palestine as the Israeli nation and its allies at large stand in agreement and support thereof.

Another problem with subjective morality is that it leaves no real meaning for the words “good” or “bad”. Speaking more academically, there would no longer remain an ontological basis for morality. One might argue that a moral subjectivist can explain why murder is wrong, but I say he will be found profoundly lost when asked: What is wrong? Is “wrong” made of particles? or can “wrong” be put in a test tube? This is where the remarkable observation of Professor Ian Markham, “Embedded in the word ‘ought’ is the sense of a moral fact transcending our life and world...The underlying character of moral language implies something universal and external.” To elaborate simply, the term “ought” implies that morality is not just a personal feeling, but a universal standard that exists outside of human invention.

Now that the definition of morality and objectivity is established, it is recommended for states to enact laws in line with it. A law (man-made, opinion based) cannot be the standard so to speak. To call a law “unjust”, there must be a fixed, objective rule outside the legal system to measure it against. If the state-sanctioned or man-made rules are the only standard, then every line it draws is straight by definition, and tyranny becomes a legal impossibility.

Second, we must distinguish between legal process and moral purpose. John Finnis, for instance, argues that a bill may follow every parliamentary procedure to the letter, but if it violates the “Divine Good” pre-installed in our nature, it remains an act of force rather than a true law. The validity of a statute is thus seen not as an arbitrary rule, but as a codification of an objective moral truth. Legality is merely a subjective human process; morality on the other hand is an objective reality.

Third, the State does not create rights; it only has the duty to recognize them. If rights were merely “gifts” from the government, the government could revoke them at any time. Finally, we must reject the “tyranny of the majority”. Just as consensus cannot make “two plus two equals five”, a ballot box cannot transform a vice into a virtue. The State’s legitimacy does not come from the number of votes it can count, but from its alignment with the objective truth that transcends our world. Without objective morality, injustice could be chosen as the main purpose behind enacting a law.

To summarize, true justice requires that the “Law” of the State bows to the “Right” of the Divine. Because morality is an objective, transcendental reality, immutable as mathematics, and it cannot be manufactured by consensus or legislation. A state only achieves legitimacy when its laws reflect these pre-installed truths, ensuring that power serves eternal justice.

The writer studies law at the Nottingham Trent University.