What is at the core of the Ukraine crisis?

Many may remember the dramatic call between US President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet Union counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. "Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall," President Reagan said, referring to the Berlin Wall, which had separated West and East Berlin since 1961. Thirty-two years since the end of the Cold War, here we are again, with the Russian advancement into Ukraine feared to be imminent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) has been aiding Ukrainian efforts to protect its sovereignty, but that too has seen mixed response from allies such as France and Germany. Could these developments presage a geopolitical disaster? Will Ukraine be annexed? Will the "defenders of democracy" really intervene? With both sides sticking to their guns, it is difficult to find justifications for these rather emotionally-charged developments—the Russian threat of an invasion, or a Nato expansion at the cost of risking war. So why are they still doing it?

Actors in the Ukrainian drama are taking action that produces tangible costs for an intangible benefit. Daniel Markey, a senior research professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, explains this with the human need to be perceived as superior which, he says, applies to states as well. He underlined the role of "prestige motives" in the origins of wars, contrasting the neo-realistic analysis of foreign policy. Psychological reasoning in explaining foreign policy is not new. D Larson was credited in Yuen Khong's "Analogies at War" for highlighting the influence of psychological concepts in foreign policy decisions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's rise to power was fuelled by his well-documented disdain for weak leadership responsible for what he believes to be the "disintegration of historical Russia." His views on Ukraine have been thoroughly clarified in his nine-page article from last year, where he blamed the West for "…[applying] divide and rule," and how Ukraine was being turned into "a springboard against Russia… [requiring the need] for the 'anti-Russia' concept which we will never accept."

The dissolution of the USSR was a devastating blow to Soviet pride. With the lowering of the red banner went nearly half its population and its glorious ownership of a sixth of the Earth's land. A 2018 Levada Centre poll showed that 66 percent of Russians regretted the fall of the USSR. China's rise relegated Russia to the back seat of international relations, where their only relevance was militaristic and belligerent acts. Many may have loved them; the West may have hated them. But the Russians cannot bear becoming the subject of indifference.

Since the dissolution and the subsequent decline of Russia's economy, Putin's takeover from Boris Yeltsin yielded favourable results, taking its GDP to unseen heights. But what also saw new "heights" were corruption, lack of freedom and democratic backsliding. The crackdowns worsened after Putin faced his greatest opposition: Alexei Navalny.

Putin's approval rating, according to the Levada Centre, was always above 62 percent, but reached 89 percent during the EU/US sanctions following the annexation of Crimea. However, with the birth of a strong opposition coupled with protests, his trustworthiness in 2018 was only 39 percent, with some blaming him for all of Russia's problems. The protection of his power in his country is predicated on another glory, which—topped with his deep-seated dream of a greater Russia—provides sufficient resolve. Success in Crimea proves means and credibility. The farcical negotiations with Nato provide sufficient cover of diplomacy.

France and Germany's conciliatory tone is well-founded, but the US cannot afford to look weak—nor can it afford a fight. The disaster in Afghanistan was debilitating enough for the Democrats, a party which cannot afford to have Trump back. The US cannot let Ukraine go undefended as it will severely harm its credibility with its allies as well. Deterrence theory has been long prescribed as the principal pillar of US foreign policy. Reputation is central to the deterrence theory, as stated by Jonathan Mercer, as threats need to be credible—a mixture of resolve, capability and interests. He also emphasised the reputation of loyalty, which the US claims to be of paramount importance. Kurds and Afghans would surely disagree.

Failing to stop the Russian advancement will give leeway to other states, such as China in the South China Sea. In a metaphorical chess breakdown with Nato and Russia on the opposite sides, the board is Ukraine. But it has real people with real needs, with 64 percent wanting to join Nato, according to a poll by UNIAN, a Ukrainian news agency. The real victims in this game will continue to be the Ukrainian citizens.

Mahadev Ghosh is a student, columnist and independent researcher.