Perspective

Do we really need a defence deal with India?

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit India from April 7 to 10. Star file photo

Military pacts or defence deals are always struck by two states or more, out of a common threat perception. In the fifties, during the Cold War, Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO, an essentially western alliance with the US, Britain, France, New Zealand, and some Asian countries like Thailand, Philippines, Iran and Turkey, to contain the growing communist influence of China and the Soviet Union. The WARSAW Military pact by Soviet Russia, with its satellite states comprising erstwhile East European states, came into being to contain western military alliance represented by NATO. Recently, the US signed a military pact with India, providing for refuelling and repairing facilities of American military aircraft and war ships in Indian military bases to contain growing Chinese influences in the strategic Indian Ocean. In 1971, India signed a 25 years treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to contain perceived SINO-American intervention in favour of Pakistan. The same treaty was later adopted to ensure Indo-Bangladesh cooperation. The Saudi-led Islamic military alliance by 39 Islamic states was forged in 2015 to fight terrorism, especially the Islamic State (IS).

As of now, Bangladesh has little threat perception from any quarter. We have no enemy, real or assumed. Thus, I would argue that there is no need for a military deal with any country. The cornerstone of Bangladesh's foreign policy, as enunciated by the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is friendship with all and malice to none. We are a non-aligned nation. As a small nation, we are wary of military alliances conceived by big powers to spread their sphere of influence.

The people of the country wish to be left alone from big power rivalries, and thus have strategic partnerships with China, Russia, India, and even Myanmar.

Newspaper discussions by the civil society, particularly by former senior Bangladeshi diplomats, have questioned the necessity of a comprehensive defence deal with India for military cooperation, sales and supply of military hardware and coordinated operation against mutually perceived threats. They point out that as of now there is enough military cooperation with India by way of exchange of high level military contacts, joint military training and exercises, and so a formal military alliance will be superfluous and irrelevant.

According to Indian press reports, India was provoked to push for such an agreement because of the increasing military cooperation between Bangladesh and China, manifested by 80 percent of imports of Chinese hardware by Bangladesh over the past decade. They pointed out that the Indian move was precipitated by the supply of two Chinese submarines to Bangladesh, indicating 'deepening of Chinese footprints in India's backyard complicating India's security paradigm'. They further said the sale rankled concerned circles who questioned the need for Bangladesh to purchase two Chinese submarines considered it offensive.

Indian analysts have also interpreted the sale as a "Chinese strategy to encircle India". Prabal Ghosh of the Observer Research Foundation, explained to the Outlook, "The sale's strategic importance cannot be understated in any way". He advocates steps "to prevent Bangladesh from playing the China card".

They also pointed out that India was rattled by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Bangladesh in October 2016 when China pledged nearly USD 24 billion assistance in trade and investment, buttressed by a promise to elevate the relationship between the two countries to a strategic partnership in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China's presence in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and Bangladesh joining China's One Belt One Road initiative is also a matter of deep concern to India. These alarm bells prompted Indian Defence Minister Monohar Parikkar and Indian Foreign Secretary Subramaniam Jaisankart to rush to Dhaka to clinch a defence agreement with Dhaka.

The proposed deal, by all intent and purpose, is an Indian initiative and agenda to counter the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean region. There is no reason for Bangladesh to become a part of the India-China rivalry by opting for the deal which will extensively limit and circumscribe our independent military options and choices. The proposed deal is fraught with deep uncertainties, risking our country being unwittingly sucked into India's potential conflicts. India is sufficiently strong to confront its adversaries without dragging Bangladesh. Besides, India is the largest importer of arms in the world, as the quality of Indian defence products is not beyond question.

Bangladesh, in recent times, has addressed a wide range of India's concerns on security and connectivity. It has been denying space in the country for Indian insurgents from its troubled north eastern states, allowed the transit and transportation of Indian goods and passengers through road, railway, and river ports, and connected the Chittagong and Mongla ports to India's north eastern states. Bangladesh has given India everything it asked for in a platter. We offered our neighbour the use of the river port in Ashuganj to transport heavy duty equipment for the Palatona power company in Tripura, and also arranged transport of 10,000 tonnes of rice to Tripura through our territories. Yet, a deal on water sharing of the Teesta River has floundered.

Like the English poet Wordsworth said about the bounty of nature, "We receive but what we give". In the same refrain of introspection, India may ask itself, "We receive from Bangladesh but what do we give them?" In that vein, wouldn't it be too much for India to expect Bangladesh to sign this defence deal?

The strength of the government rests on popular support and not on external help. To its credit, the present Bangladesh government is successfully walking a quadruple equidistant tightrope, effectively managing foreign policy with America, Russia, China and India without tilting to one side or the other. The defence deal will seriously compromise our independent stance.

If the current public discourse on the subject in Bangladesh is any indication, this is an extremely unpopular measure which has the potential of a deep political fallout and backlash with damaging consequences. The government, responsible for our booming economy and significant trade surplus, is firmly in the driver's seat and can steer clear any outside pressure which is detrimental to its national interest. We hope that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will resist such an asymmetric and outlandish deal that will add nothing to our pace of development. Bangladesh is committed to strengthening stability and peace in the region. India and China are both very powerful and influential powers in Asia. We cannot be a part of a process that furthers India-China's armed rivalry.

The writer is a former diplomat. 


Corrigendum

On April 1, we published this op-ed piece written by Abdul Hannan on the Editorial page. We had, however, erroneously published a photograph of another Abdul Hannan who had written for us earlier.

We sincerely regret this unintended error and apologise to both the persons concerned for any inconvenience caused. The correct picture is given here.

Comments

Do we really need a defence deal with India?

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit India from April 7 to 10. Star file photo

Military pacts or defence deals are always struck by two states or more, out of a common threat perception. In the fifties, during the Cold War, Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO, an essentially western alliance with the US, Britain, France, New Zealand, and some Asian countries like Thailand, Philippines, Iran and Turkey, to contain the growing communist influence of China and the Soviet Union. The WARSAW Military pact by Soviet Russia, with its satellite states comprising erstwhile East European states, came into being to contain western military alliance represented by NATO. Recently, the US signed a military pact with India, providing for refuelling and repairing facilities of American military aircraft and war ships in Indian military bases to contain growing Chinese influences in the strategic Indian Ocean. In 1971, India signed a 25 years treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to contain perceived SINO-American intervention in favour of Pakistan. The same treaty was later adopted to ensure Indo-Bangladesh cooperation. The Saudi-led Islamic military alliance by 39 Islamic states was forged in 2015 to fight terrorism, especially the Islamic State (IS).

As of now, Bangladesh has little threat perception from any quarter. We have no enemy, real or assumed. Thus, I would argue that there is no need for a military deal with any country. The cornerstone of Bangladesh's foreign policy, as enunciated by the Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is friendship with all and malice to none. We are a non-aligned nation. As a small nation, we are wary of military alliances conceived by big powers to spread their sphere of influence.

The people of the country wish to be left alone from big power rivalries, and thus have strategic partnerships with China, Russia, India, and even Myanmar.

Newspaper discussions by the civil society, particularly by former senior Bangladeshi diplomats, have questioned the necessity of a comprehensive defence deal with India for military cooperation, sales and supply of military hardware and coordinated operation against mutually perceived threats. They point out that as of now there is enough military cooperation with India by way of exchange of high level military contacts, joint military training and exercises, and so a formal military alliance will be superfluous and irrelevant.

According to Indian press reports, India was provoked to push for such an agreement because of the increasing military cooperation between Bangladesh and China, manifested by 80 percent of imports of Chinese hardware by Bangladesh over the past decade. They pointed out that the Indian move was precipitated by the supply of two Chinese submarines to Bangladesh, indicating 'deepening of Chinese footprints in India's backyard complicating India's security paradigm'. They further said the sale rankled concerned circles who questioned the need for Bangladesh to purchase two Chinese submarines considered it offensive.

Indian analysts have also interpreted the sale as a "Chinese strategy to encircle India". Prabal Ghosh of the Observer Research Foundation, explained to the Outlook, "The sale's strategic importance cannot be understated in any way". He advocates steps "to prevent Bangladesh from playing the China card".

They also pointed out that India was rattled by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Bangladesh in October 2016 when China pledged nearly USD 24 billion assistance in trade and investment, buttressed by a promise to elevate the relationship between the two countries to a strategic partnership in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China's presence in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and Bangladesh joining China's One Belt One Road initiative is also a matter of deep concern to India. These alarm bells prompted Indian Defence Minister Monohar Parikkar and Indian Foreign Secretary Subramaniam Jaisankart to rush to Dhaka to clinch a defence agreement with Dhaka.

The proposed deal, by all intent and purpose, is an Indian initiative and agenda to counter the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean region. There is no reason for Bangladesh to become a part of the India-China rivalry by opting for the deal which will extensively limit and circumscribe our independent military options and choices. The proposed deal is fraught with deep uncertainties, risking our country being unwittingly sucked into India's potential conflicts. India is sufficiently strong to confront its adversaries without dragging Bangladesh. Besides, India is the largest importer of arms in the world, as the quality of Indian defence products is not beyond question.

Bangladesh, in recent times, has addressed a wide range of India's concerns on security and connectivity. It has been denying space in the country for Indian insurgents from its troubled north eastern states, allowed the transit and transportation of Indian goods and passengers through road, railway, and river ports, and connected the Chittagong and Mongla ports to India's north eastern states. Bangladesh has given India everything it asked for in a platter. We offered our neighbour the use of the river port in Ashuganj to transport heavy duty equipment for the Palatona power company in Tripura, and also arranged transport of 10,000 tonnes of rice to Tripura through our territories. Yet, a deal on water sharing of the Teesta River has floundered.

Like the English poet Wordsworth said about the bounty of nature, "We receive but what we give". In the same refrain of introspection, India may ask itself, "We receive from Bangladesh but what do we give them?" In that vein, wouldn't it be too much for India to expect Bangladesh to sign this defence deal?

The strength of the government rests on popular support and not on external help. To its credit, the present Bangladesh government is successfully walking a quadruple equidistant tightrope, effectively managing foreign policy with America, Russia, China and India without tilting to one side or the other. The defence deal will seriously compromise our independent stance.

If the current public discourse on the subject in Bangladesh is any indication, this is an extremely unpopular measure which has the potential of a deep political fallout and backlash with damaging consequences. The government, responsible for our booming economy and significant trade surplus, is firmly in the driver's seat and can steer clear any outside pressure which is detrimental to its national interest. We hope that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will resist such an asymmetric and outlandish deal that will add nothing to our pace of development. Bangladesh is committed to strengthening stability and peace in the region. India and China are both very powerful and influential powers in Asia. We cannot be a part of a process that furthers India-China's armed rivalry.

The writer is a former diplomat. 


Corrigendum

On April 1, we published this op-ed piece written by Abdul Hannan on the Editorial page. We had, however, erroneously published a photograph of another Abdul Hannan who had written for us earlier.

We sincerely regret this unintended error and apologise to both the persons concerned for any inconvenience caused. The correct picture is given here.

Comments

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