The intersection of transboundary water conflicts and human rights

When the United Nations General Assembly, in 2010, affirmed that 'the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation' (Resolution 64/292) is a human right, it impliedly recognised water as a fundamental legal entitlement connected to dignity, health, and life. However, across various river basins, such as the Teesta, the Nile, and the Euphrates, upstream states have often used water as tools of geopolitical leverage. This article highlights that complex and uncertain nature of the right's implementation despite its acknowledgment as a right.

The legal frameworks, such as the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention or the 1992 UNECE Water Convention, which govern transboundary watercourses mainly focus on several key principles, such as the fair and reasonable use of shared water resources, the obligation to avoid causing significant harm to other states, and the requirement for cooperation and notification before undertaking major projects that may impact transboundary waters. Importantly, Article 10 of the 1997 Convention requires that, in allocating uses of a river, 'special regard' be given to the requirements of vital human needs. The International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case between Hungary and Slovakia held that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally diverting the course of Danube, deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable share of shared natural resources. Yet the law provides no formula for determining what constitutes 'equitable' when populations compete in the face of insufficient water, and most critically, with no compulsory mechanism for adjudicating this balance when parties disagree.

International human rights law already contains a firm basis for claims to water. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), read with General Comment No. 15 (2002), recognises that water is necessary to secure an adequate standard of living and the highest attainable standard of health; the water entitlement must be 'sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable'. Child and gender-specific instruments (CRC Art. 24, CEDAW Art. 14) reinforce the special protection duty for vulnerable groups. These sources therefore impose on states obligations to respect, protect and fulfil access to potable water for their populations.

But two doctrinal complications arise when these obligations intersect with transboundary rivers. First, human rights law traditionally operates vertically i.e., it governs obligations a state owes to persons within its jurisdiction. Second, remedies and enforcement for extraterritorial harms are weak. The Teesta River is a case study of these doctrinal limits. The river's seasonal lean flows are vital to northern Bangladesh's agriculture, livelihoods and food security. But international politics has frustrated Bangladesh's efforts to translate legal principles into flows. Bangladesh and India reached draft agreements on how to divide the Teesta River's water in 1983 and again in 2011. The 2011 draft proposed giving Bangladesh about 37.5% of the river's lean-season flows, but the agreements were never finalised. While Bangladesh has joined UNECE/UN instruments, showing willingness to implement international principles, India prefers bilateral agreements, and internal political factors have effectively blocked the implementation of any treaty.

The Teesta conflict is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a systemic pattern revealing how transboundary water wars violate the human right to water across multiple river basins globally. Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project, which includes 22 dams such as the Atatürk Dam, has significantly reduced the Tigris–Euphrates' flow to Syria and Iraq by 30-60%. Turkish claims of sovereignty over its water rejecting the idea of shared water resources, has had severe human rights consequences, particularly in Iraq, where water shortages threaten the Mesopotamian Marshes, a UNESCO World Heritage site, and risk displacing communities. This situation undermines not only the right to water but also the rights to food, livelihood, housing, and cultural heritage.

Such cases illuminate the legal challenge between state sovereignty over watercourses and human rights obligations to people. The lack of compulsory dispute resolution is a key issue in transboundary water conflicts. The UN Charter's Article 33 calls for peaceful dispute settlement, but all methods require the consent of both parties. This means that an upstream state with greater power can simply refuse binding dispute resolution, leaving downstream populations with no remedy even as their basic rights are violated. Thus, the downstream states have to either accept unfair bilateral agreements dictated by power, or take unilateral actions that may be seen as hostile and provoke further retaliation.

Water is the basis of the right to life (ICCPR Art. 6), the right to health (ICESCR Art. 12), and the right to food (ICESCR Art. 11). General Comment No. 15 of the ICESCR explicitly states that water is essential for the realisation of all other human rights. The Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 31 affirms that ICCPR obligations may arise where a state exercises effective control over individuals, even outside its territory- a principle also reflected in the Maastricht Guidelines.  When applied to shared rivers, these principles therefore, indicate that the victims of water diversion are not downstream states, they are downstream populations. More recently, the ICJ's Silala River judgment (Chile v. Bolivia, 2022) reaffirmed that the customary obligation to prevent transboundary harm applies to all shared waters.  On the other hand, treaty bodies have recognised water access for downstream populations in situations of armed conflict or occupation (e.g. CESCR and HRC citing Israeli control over Palestinian water).

The convergence of transboundary watercourse law and human rights law creates a composite legal framework in which upstream states bear enforceable obligations toward downstream populations, not merely toward downstream states. It transforms the character of state responsibility. Breaches of watercourse obligations, violations of the no-harm rule, failure to cooperate, or inequitable water allocation simultaneously constitute human rights violations when they deprive populations of water necessary for life, health, and subsistence. This dual character implies that remedies must address not only state-to-state relations but also the actual harm suffered by rights holders.  In this sense, the governance of transboundary rivers must be guided by the principle that the basic needs and dignity of all people come before political convenience or power.

The writer is official contributor to Law & Our Rights.