The Constitution Reform Commission's recently published report has reignited debate about Bangladesh's democratic future. The report proposes a bicameral legislature, with a Senate as the upper house and a National Assembly as the lower house. But a fundamental question remains: will a Senate with limited powers, modelled after India's Rajya Sabha (Council of States), truly strengthen democracy, or will it be a costly and largely symbolic addition, given our Parliament's recent history?

This question is particularly crucial considering the current state of parliamentary oversight. Over the past decades, Parliament has enacted laws that violate fundamental rights, including the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006, the Digital Security Act 2018, and the Cyber Security Act 2023— each used to silence dissent. One-party dominance, coupled with restrictive constitutional provisions such as Article 70, has severely weakened Parliament's ability to challenge the executive. Extensive searches of publicly available records and parliamentary proceedings from the last five years have not revealed any instances where Parliament has successfully overturned or significantly altered a major government policy decision. This pattern reveals a critical weakness: a Parliament that not only fails to hold the executive accountable but, at times, actively undermines fundamental rights.

Instead of adopting a foreign model uncritically, Bangladesh has a crucial opportunity to craft a system that reflects our own unique circumstances and aspirations.

The Commission's report proposes a Senate with limited powers, similar to the Indian Rajya Sabha. This proposal raises concerns that it may fail to address the existing lack of parliamentary oversight and could, in fact, further concentrate power in the hands of the executive— contrary to the Commission's stated reform objectives.

It is a foundational principle of governance that rights enshrined on paper are only as robust as the institutions that safeguard them. Effective democracy is not simply about proclaiming freedoms; it is about meticulously constructing a system of checks and balances that prevents any single branch of government from accumulating excessive power. The structure of the legislature—whether it is a single chamber or two—plays a pivotal role in this delicate equilibrium. Bangladesh's unicameral Parliament has failed to play this pivotal role. The question now is: what kind of bicameral system would best serves the country's interests?

The proposed Senate, with limited legislative powers, promises a chamber of review without outright obstruction. But is this model, inspired by the Rajya Sabha, a strength or only a potential trap? While a 'chamber of revision' sounds appealing, a closer examination reveals its potential pitfalls. A Senate without substantial power provides a weak check on the National Assembly. This is especially concerning in the context of Bangladesh, where power is already tilted towards the Prime Minister and the executive branch, and the Prime Minister, being a creature and leader of the legislature, effectively controls the legislative body. A weak upper house, like those in India or the UK, risks further centralising power. If the Senate's primary role is advisory, merely delaying bills for a few months, it risks becoming a costly, symbolic body. Its value must be demonstrable— not just assumed. Will it provide unique insights, or will it merely echo the National Assembly's debates, adding to the bureaucracy without real benefits?

The ability of an Indian-style Senate to protect minority rights is also questionable. Without veto power or the ability to significantly amend legislation, its capacity to safeguard marginalised communities is limited. In politically polarised environments, public pressure alone is often insufficient to counter majoritarian rule. Additionally, in parliamentary systems, the executive is drawn from and accountable to the legislature. This fusion of power means the Prime Minister, as leader of the majority party, wields considerable influence. A weak Senate would only amplify this influence, further weakening the separation of powers vital to a healthy democracy. As history shows, power becomes too concentrated, even the strongest constitutional guarantees become meaningless.

Bangladesh's democratic journey has seen both progress and persistent challenges. Does an Indian-style Senate suit the country's needs? Are we adopting a familiar model without critically assessing its implications? How robust are our existing checks and balances? The reality is that Parliament often lacks the independence and resources to scrutinise the executive effectively. The Prime Minister's dominance already limits accountability. A weak upper house may not be the solution if the real need lies in strengthening Parliament and fostering a culture of parliamentary oversight.

Bangladesh is a rapidly developing nation facing complex governance challenges. Will a Senate with limited powers help or hinder progress? Will it add valuable expertise and deliberation, or merely slow legislative processes without improving the quality of laws?

Instead of adopting a foreign model uncritically, Bangladesh has a crucial opportunity to craft a system that reflects our own unique circumstances and aspirations. This might involve investing in the independence and resources of the directly elected National Assembly in the proposed bicameral system as a more effective way to ensure accountability, protect minority rights, and promote robust debate. There are other models of bicameralism that offer more substantial checks and balances. Perhaps a system with a more powerful upper house, tailored to the specific context of Bangladesh, would be more appropriate. Addressing the broader challenges of the Indian-style parliamentary system through constitutional reforms that strengthen the separation of powers and enhance checks and balances could be a more productive path towards a more robust and accountable democracy. As the late US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia observed, 'When [power is centralised], the game is over.' Indeed, the future of our democracy depends on a proper balance of power.

The debate over the Senate is not merely an exercise in thinking about its institutional design. It is a fundamental question about the kind of democracy that Bangladesh aspires to build. We must move beyond the appeal of familiar models and engage in a critical discussion about what best serves the nation's interests. What kind of democracy do we aspire to build? The future of democracy depends on it.

The writer is Assistant Professor and Chairman, Department of Law, Z. H. Sikder University of Science and Technology.