Israel's
killing of hamas leaders
Mayur
Patel
The April 18th killing in Gaza of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi, following
on the heels of the killing of his predecessor, Sheik Yassin, provoked
an international outcry about Israel's policy of targeted killing. Such
tactics have been widely condemned as unlawful under international law.
In contrast, the United States, while occasionally uncomfortable with
Israel's policy, has acknowledged that Israel has a right to self- defence
that could be used in some circumstances to target leaders of terrorist
groups much as the United States has asserted its own right to target
Osama Bin Laden. From a legal standpoint, there are three critical issues
that determine the validity of this policy: the law of self-defense;
international humanitarian law; and the principle of proportionality.
A good faith analysis can lead to differing conclusions on the legality
of Israel's policy.
Self-defense
A key determinant in assessing Israeli policy is whether it is for the
purpose of self-defense or whether it is a reprisal. The concept of
self-defense in international law has two primary sources. First, there
is an explicit reference to self-defense in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which states: Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Those who argue
in favor of Israel's right to self-defense in this situation hold that
Hamas's numerous suicide bombings against Israel constitute an armed
attack, much as the United States has argued that the use of civilian
airliners to destroy the World Trade Center constituted an armed attack.
Furthermore, they note that Hamas has openly declared its intention
to strike Israel again. Israel faces an ongoing threat and the Security
Council has not yet acted. Consequently, they argue that Article 51
provides Israel with a right to employ military force against Hamas's
leaders.
Those who dispute
Article 51's applicability generally do not dispute that the number
of Israeli casualties is substantial. However, the issue for them is
that an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 is an armed attack
from a state. Hamas
is not a state. It cannot even be argued to constitute a de-facto state.
According to this view, Hamas's attacks are more akin to the acts of
a violent gang, which must be dealt with as a law enforcement problem.
Consequently, Article 51 would be inapplicable and the targeted killings
would be unlawful reprisals or extrajudicial acts of homicide.
The other legal
source of self-defence is customary international law. In particular,
many scholars cite the Caroline doctrine, which sets forth the standard
for anticipatory self-defense in customary international law.
The Caroline doctrine
arises from an incident in the 1840s where British soldiers crossed
into the United States to destroy a ship ferrying arms to insurgents
in Canada. Both the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that
anticipatory action was allowed only when the necessity of that self-defence
is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation. After World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal reaffirmed
the Caroline doctrine.
It should be noted
that after the advent of the U.N Charter, the Caroline doctrine is not
universally accepted; many reputable scholars have argued that Article
51 of the UN Charter supercedes it. Even conceding its validity, though,
reasonable individuals can come to differing conclusions on its applicability
in various situations.
For example, most
would agree that missiles being fueled for launch are an imminent threat
under the Caroline Doctrine. Few would concede, however, that mere discussions
on the construction of such weapons constitute a threat under this standard.
However, reasonable people could come to differing conclusions about
whether the actual shipment and emplacement of such weapons, for example
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, gives rise to a right of self-defense.
In that instance, the United States chose not to justify its interdiction
of Soviet missiles bound for Cuba as a measure of anticipatory self-defense.
In the present situation,
some of the recently targeted individuals such as Rantissi and Sheik
Yassin were not killed while in the process of carrying out an attack.
However, they were presumed to be in a position to order future attacks.
The more one agrees with Israel's assessment that the targeted individuals
were "ticking bombs," the more one would believe that a right
under the Caroline doctrine arises. One could also argue that since
Hamas has already carried out attacks, the Caroline doctrine is inapplicable
in a strict sense, even though it remains relevant to show that customary
international law recognises a right of self-defense.
International
humanitarian law
Another legal issue about Israel's policy is whether it comports with
international humanitarian law, which comprises the rules that govern
the conduct of armed conflict. Under this one question that needs to
be resolved is whether those targeted are combatants. The Geneva Conventions
on the Law of War, particularly common Article 3, prohibit the intentional
killing of civilians. Common Article 3 prohibits:
"(a) violence
to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;"
and "(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples."
Other international
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, state that arbitrary execution is unlawful. Individuals
who belong to the military wing of Hamas, such as Rantissi, are likely
to be considered combatants. Individuals like Sheik Yassin, who was
a quadriplegic and supposedly a spiritual rather than military leader,
may be subject to more debate on their status as a combatants. Targeted
killings also implicate the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention
of 1907, which are widely viewed as customary international law. It
is believed that most targeted individuals have been killed in helicopter
strikes. The Hague Regulations prohibit the killing or wounding treacherously
of individuals belonging to a hostile nation or army. Killing or targeting
particular individuals during an armed conflict is not illegal in itself
under international law, nor is it accurately described as assassination,
if the individuals are members of a hostile force. For example, the
United States' targeted attack on Admiral Yamamoto during the Second
World War was widely considered to be legitimate. The key issue in deciding
legality in such cases is whether or not perfidy or treacherous means
were employed.
The employment of
treachery is what distinguishes assassination from a traditional killing.
Killing individuals by a helicopter strike is generally an accepted
tactic of warfare .More stealthy means, however, could be considered
as acts of treachery. Some would also argue that persons at mosques
or in prayer have no means of defence and thus are impermissible targets.
The question becomes murkier, though, if such individuals are inciting
followers or giving orders at those facilities for hostile acts against
an enemy.
Proportionality
The last key issue regarding Israel's policy is whether it violates
the basic international law principle of proportionality. Proportionality
holds that any given action by a state must be substantially proportional
to the given threat or wrong. Israel's policy of targeted killing has
resulted in the deaths of multiple civilians. Were those deaths avoidable
if different tactics were utilised? Proportionality analysis depends
upon the circumstances and the situation. Many have suggested that Israel
had a less violent option at its disposal: an arrest. As the occupying
power, Israel could potentially deploy troops or police to arrest these
individuals.
Proportionality
is an important rule that could distinguish Israel's policy from the
American attack on terrorists in Yemen last year via a predator drone.
An arrest may be infeasible in the middle of a lawless dessert in Yemen.
Civilians are also unlikely to be wounded in such an attack; thus the
attack is likely to be proportional under the circumstances.
Whether Israel's
policy is proportional is not an open and shut case. Deploying soldiers
or police to apprehend suspects in hostile urban areas is a dangerous
affair. Whether more lives are put at danger through an attempted arrest
or a helicopter strike is debatable; hence the proportionality of Israel's
policy is unclear.
Concluding
Remarks
Israel's policy of targeted killings raises serious questions of international
law, but the answers are not obvious. Although observers view the policy
as contravening international law, there is a substantial amount of
uncertainty regarding the application of the relevant law to the situation
at hand. Thus, good faith analysis could lead to starkly different conclusions
on the legality of any such policy.
Source
: American Society for International Law (ASIL), New York.