|   Section 
        4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980
       Any fresh demand of dowry will constitute an offence  
         
       High 
        Court Division (Criminal Revisional jurisdiction)  
        Criminal Misc. Case No. 10301 of 2003  
        Md. Hanif Howlader 
        Vs 
        Most, Jahanara Begum and another  
        Before Mrs. Justice Nazmun Ara Sultana and Mr. Justice Muhammad Abdul 
        Hafiz 
        Date of Judgent: July 26, 2003 
        Result : Petition rejected summarily 
      Background 
         
        Nazmun Ara Sultana, J: This application under section 561A of the Code 
        of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the accused-petitioner praying 
        for quashment of the proceeding of the CR. Case NO. 9 of 2003 under section 
        4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980 pending in the Court of Magistrate, 
        First Class, Zone-1, Perojpur. 
       
        The above mentioned CR case was started on a petition of complain lodged 
        by the complainant-opposite party Most Jahanara Begum on the allegation 
        that she was married to accused-petitioner, Md. Hanif Howlader on 14.2.1994 
        by registered kabinnama. Two children were born in their wedlock. But 
        since few months after their marriage the accused-started demanding dowry 
        from the complainant and also used to torture her on that demand. At one 
        stage the accused after torturing the complainant for dowry drove away 
        her from his house with her children. Since then the complainant had been 
        residing at her father's house. The father and other relatives of the 
        complainant requested the accused to take her back abandoning the demand 
        of dowry. But the accused did not agree and remained insistent on his 
        demand of dowry. 
      However, 
        the quashment of the above proceeding has been sought on the ground that 
        the ingredients of section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are absent in 
        this case and as such this case will not come under the purview of section 
        4 of the said Act. 
      Deliberation 
         
        Mr. Syed Ziaul Karim , the learned advocate for the accused petitioner 
        has argued that according to the FIR the dowry was demanded long after 
        the marriage and that there is no mention in this FIR that at the time 
        of marriage or even at any time before or after the marriage there was 
        any agreement for giving of any dowry. The learned advocate has contended 
        that since at the time of marriage there was no agreement for giving of 
        dowry, the subsequent demand of money or any other thing from the complainant 
        will not constitute the offence of demand of dowry as defined in section 
        2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980. 
      In 
        support of his contention the learned advocate has cited a decision of 
        this Division reported in 37 DLR at page 227 wherein it was held that 
        to be 'dowry' it has to be given or agreed to be given either directly 
        or indirectly by the parties at the time of marriage or at any time before 
        or after the marriage. 
      But 
        the Appellate Division, in another case has already given a decision as 
        to the dowry differing with the above decision of the High Court Division. 
        In the case of Abul Basher Howlader Vs. the State and another reported 
        in 46 DLR at page 169, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction and 
        sentence imposed on the appellant under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition 
        Act. The Appellate Division held that the subsequent demand of dowry even 
        if there was no agreement for giving of the same would constitute the 
        offence of demand of 'dowry'.  
      In 
        that case the demand of dowry was made long after the marriage and there 
        was no agreement for giving of dowry either at the time of marriage or 
        at any time before or after the marriage. The Appellate Division upheld 
        the conviction of the appellant Abul Basher Howlader under section 4 of 
        the Dory Prohibition Act 1980. The court held that for a conviction under 
        section 4 of Dory Prohibition Act, the world 'Dowry' need not be interpreted 
        in terms of the definition of 'dowry' in section 2 of the said Act. Their 
        Lordships held thus:- "we will say that if a fresh demand for dowry 
        is made after solemnisation of marriage about which there was no prior 
        agreement and which demand does not fall strictly within the definition 
        of dowry in section 2, then the word 'dowry' in Section 4 is repugnant 
        in the subject or context to the definition itself." Dowry' in section 
        4 has therefore to be understood in its ordinary meaning, namely property 
        brought by woman to her husband at marriage or vice versa." 
      So, 
        it is evident that the Appellate Division has already settled this point 
        that if dowry is demanded after the marriage about which there was no 
        agreement at the time of marriage or at any time before or after the marriage, 
        will constitute the offence of demanding dowry which is punishable under 
        section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980. 
      Decision 
         
        It appears that in that case of Abul Basher Howlader Vs. The State and 
        another (criminal appeal no. 8 of 1993) the same advocate Syed Ziaul Karim 
        was the lawyer for the appellant. It is unfortunate that the learned advocate 
        Syed Ziaul Krim inspite of being very much aware of this above decision 
        of the Appellate Division has insisted much for a rule in this present 
        case referring the above mentioned decision of the High Court Division. 
      However, 
        from the above discussion it is evident that this application under section 
        561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure has got no merit and as such it 
        is rejected summarily. 
      Mr.Syd 
        Ziaul Karim, advocate for the petitioner. 
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