March 1971 was electric.

A campaign of many years had reached a crescendo. The people's aspirations were vindicated as their champions had won a comprehensive majority in the 1970 election, sweeping the erstwhile East Pakistan. The people feverishly waited for Mujib to take charge of the centre that would begin their emancipation. But the Pakistani rulers were stalling.

The air became thick with anger and frustrations that led to defiance and protests by the time March had arrived. A non-cooperation movement was on in full swing and the army could not subdue it despite firing upon protesters. Bangabandhu was proving to be the de facto ruler of Bangladesh.

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In this context, Mujib was set to take the podium at Dhaka's Race Course Maidan (currently Suhrawardy Udyan) on the 7th. Yahya Khan, the military chief and Pakistani president, had announced he would address the people the day before, on the 6th. The entire country was taut with tension. The diplomatic corps were abuzz with speculations while the army was on alert, ready to step in if Mujib went out of line.

A declassified memo of March 4, 1971, addressed to US President Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger, said the situation in East Pakistan was "deteriorating".

Mujib seems to have virtually slammed the door on the possibility of East-West accommodation by categorically rejecting President Yahya's plan to hold a conference of the major political leaders on March 10, the cable reads.

Mujib has admitted to several foreign correspondents "off the record" that he will announce the equivalent to independence for East Pakistan on Sunday (March 7), said the memo which also noted that there were reports of forces being flown into Dacca. There was also troop movement from the West via ship.

All eyes were on the March 7 programme set to be addressed by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Millions held their breath, waiting to see if Mujib would declare independence, breaking all ties with West Pakistan once and for all. Would this be the moment?

Then US consul general, Archer K Blood writes that it was common knowledge Mujib would outline his future course of action at the rally. Noting that Yahya's address was scheduled on the 6th, Blood writes in his book "The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh: Memoirs of an American Diplomat" that this "conjunction gave rise to much anxiety, hope and speculation in East Pakistan".

"The key question debated was whether or not Mujib would use the occasion to declare the independence of Bangladesh, and, if so, how would the army react," he writes.

In his address, Yahya vowed to preserve the unity of Pakistan and announced that the national assembly would now meet on March 25.

Declassified minutes of a crucial meeting chaired by Kissinger in Washington on March 6 show it was agreed to discuss the situation with the British to see if they would take the lead to discourage Pakistan from using force, if it should become necessary.

The meeting also instructed the Dhaka mission to say nothing and refer it to Washington if they were approached by Mujib to recognise a separate East Pakistan regime, according to the minutes of the meeting.

Meanwhile, Indian historian Srinath Raghavan in his book "1971: a global history of the creation of Bangladesh," writes that on March 6 evening, Yahya sent a telex for Mujib. "Please do not take any hasty decision. I will soon come to Dacca and discuss the details with you. I assure you that your aspirations and commitments to the people can be fully honoured. I have a scheme in mind which will more than satisfy your Six Points."

Yahya's immediate concern was to forestall a unilateral declaration of independence by Mujib, as rumours about it had flitted like bats in the press and political circles for several days. Such a declaration would be problematic both internally and externally, Raghavan writes. "On the one hand, the military was not yet fully geared up to quash dissent in the East. The troop reinforcement [that] begun in late February was progressing slowly."

The option of declaring independence was discussed by the Awami League's working committee on March 6. The party's leaders knew that the students and younger cadre "strongly favoured such a declaration". Indeed, there was "little doubt" that anything short of independence would "not be acceptable" to the bulk of their following. Yet the leadership wanted to move cautiously. For one thing, such a declaration would provide the military just the "pretext" to use force, Raghavan observes.

Then commander of the 14th division in East Pakistan, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, recounts his version of those tumultuous days in his book "A Stranger In My Own Country".

He wrote that on the eve of March 7, two East Pakistani gentlemen met him, introducing themselves as Mujib's emissaries whom he cautioned strongly.

"I told the emissaries to inform Sheikh Mujib that, during his speech, I would have the army -- armed with guns and tanks -- standing by in the cantonment, ready to move immediately," he wrote.

In case Sheikh Mujib attacked the integrity of the country and proclaimed the unilateral declaration of independence, he would discharge his duty without hesitation and with all the power at his command. "I would have the army march in immediately with orders to wreck the meeting and, if necessary, raze Dhaka to the ground. I impressed upon the emissaries that they should inform Sheikh Mujib that the consequences of indiscretion would be disastrous and the onus would be entirely on him. I advised Sheikh Mujib to keep the door open for further negotiations and avoid unnecessary bloodshed."

On the morning of March 7, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S Farland, called on Mujib, writes Siddiq Salik who was then public relations officer of the Pakistan Army in Dhaka in his book "Witness to Surrender".

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"GW Choudhury [former member of Pakistan cabinet from April 1969 to February 1971] tells us more about Farland's call on Mujib. He says, 'The US policy was made clear to Mujib by Ambassador Farland who advised him not to look towards Washington for any help for his secessionist game'," Siddiq Salik writes.

The Dacca station of Radio Pakistan had made arrangements to broadcast the March 7 address live on its own initiative. The radio announcers were already speaking from the Race Course, telling the listeners about the unprecedented enthusiasm of the million-strong audience.

The headquarters of the chief martial law administrator intervened and directed Dacca to stop this "nonsense", remembers Salik. "I conveyed the orders to the radio station. The Bengali friend at the receiving end reacted sharply to the order. He said, 'If we can't broadcast the voice of seventy-five million people, we refuse to work.' With that, the station went off the air."

And it was against this backdrop that Mujib pronounced those immortal words in his booming baritone: "The struggle this time is a struggle for emancipation. The struggle this time is a struggle for independence. Joy Bangla."

"Mujib's speech on March 7 was more notable for what he did not say than for what he actually said. He did not, as some feared and some hoped, declare an independent Bangla Desh. Instead, he called for a peaceful, non-cooperation movement to continue the struggle for independence and emancipation of Bengalis," Blood writes.

Another declassified memo from Kissinger to Nixon from March 13 noted that while Mujib had stepped back a bit from a declaration of independence, the full text of his March 7 speech conveys a harsher tone than the initial summary reports, and it seems apparent that his retreat was tactical.

"He made clear that something very close to independence, i.e., 'emancipation,' is his goal and that his movement will not be deflected until that is achieved," Kissinger wrote.