Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 5 Num 1070 Tue. June 05, 2007  
   
Point-Counterpoint


Notes From History
1967 Six-Day War -- the reality and the aftermath


Forty years ago, in June 1967, a war erupted in the Middle East that was to leave politics in the region and in the wider world beyond it changed forever. The Six-Day War would humiliate Arabs in a way never seen before; and it would leave the state of Israel in possession of territory that far outstripped its original geography.

The rumblings of the 1967 war first began to be felt in the earlier part of the year, when a series of clashes occurred between Syrian and Israeli forces on the border between their two countries. By May, those rumblings had turned into portents of a serious crisis in the making. On May 15, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared a state of alert in his country and sent troops into the Sinai.

The next day, he appeared to take tougher action when he asked the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (Unef) to withdraw a limited number of his troops so that Cairo could occupy certain positions between Sinai and Israel.

Later in the day, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, made it clear that Nasser's demand was not being accepted. Two days later, on May 18, incensed by the UN's response, Egypt's president called for a total withdrawal of Unef troops. The move signaled a clear deterioration of the crisis.

In a demonstration of toughness, President Nasser dispatched his troops to Sharm el Sheikh, which was easily occupied on May 21. Buoyed by his own action, Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba on May 22. The move was clearly aimed at preventing Israeli shipping from passing through the area.

The decision was swiftly condemned by US President Lyndon Johnson. A number of other western leaders adopted a similar position. Meanwhile, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, on a whirlwind tour of western capitals to acquaint governments with his country's growing concerns about its security, met French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris on May 25.

The French leader advised Eban that Israel ought not to fire the first bullet should the crisis lead to war. It was advice that would also come from President Johnson. Within Israel, former premier David Ben Gurion and others were already putting pressure on Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on the necessity of safeguarding the country's security.

Pressure was also brought to bear on the prime minister to induct General Moshe Dayan, a former war hero, into the cabinet as minister for defence. Dayan was appointed to the job, a clear sign that Israel was serious about self-protection.

In Cairo, President Nasser contributed to a further rise in the mercury level when he told a meeting of the Arab Trades Union Congress on May 26 that all Arabs were determined to destroy Israel. His remarks prompted worries even from his Soviet allies, who then tried to have him exercise restraint.

On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan initialled a defence deal with Nasser on joint strategy in a possible war. The move gave rise to new concerns in global capitals, to a point where American administration officials arranged to have Egypt's Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin come to Washington for talks.

On June 2, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Israeli government of such moves. On the same day, General Dayan argued that Israel had to strike its enemies without delay. On June 4, he called for a pre-emptive strike on Egypt and its allies.

Early in the morning on June 5, the government of Israel went into action. Israeli jet fighters flew into Egypt, catching Egyptian security unawares. The entire Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground before anyone knew what was happening. In effect, Egypt lost the struggle on the first day of the war.

By June 8, Israel was in control of a huge area from the Gaza Strip to the Suez Canal to Sharm el Sheikh. A day earlier, on June 7, Jordan stood humiliated through seeing the Arab sector of Jerusalem, Jericho, Nablus and the West Bank of the Jordan river pass under Israeli control. By June 10, effectively the final day of the war, Israel was in control of the Golan Heights. The Syrian regime was left badly bleeding.

During the entirety of the Six-Day War, Israel lost a mere thousand men. In contrast, the Arabs saw more than 18,000 of their soldiers lose their lives. In the immediate aftermath of the war, President Nasser offered to quit his job, a gesture that was rejected by crowds marching in his support through the streets of Cairo.

Over the next few weeks and months, Egypt, Jordan and Syria went through deep agonizing over their colossal defeat at Israel's hands. In Cairo, a clear move appeared to be on to find a scapegoat behind the humiliation. It was Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Nasser's defence minister and nominal head of the armed forces, who paid the price.

The Egyptian authorities accused Amer of launching an abortive coup against Nasser days after the war. His plans coming unstuck, said Cairo, Amer committed suicide. To this day, reports persist of Amer actually being forced to take his own life.