This leads to the debate of ranking of countries by institutions like Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, World Economic Forum, UN Human Development Index and Transparency International, as having full, partial or non-democratic governments.

Examples could be given of countries like Burma or Zambia where democratia, or power of the people, is either non-existent or has been trampled by "elected" dictators who give priority to demagoguery over development -- a reversal of the process of modernisation wherein the structural basis of societies progressed from community in which natural will predominated to that of association in which rational will predominates.

The question that has remained unanswered is about the validity of the premise that materially poor societies are unable to create and sustain democracies. This is because in these societies the middle class, which plays a crucial role in sustaining the democratic way of life, is generally absent or numerically too small to a make significant contribution to transformation to a more distributive society, or to Joseph Stiglitz's "moral growth" that modern day ethical economists would endorse.

One of the reasons people prefer the democratic way of life is that the political leaders are expected to be accountable for their actions. But here again Professor Richard Sklar (of UCLA) points out that there are two principal forms of accountability that need to be distinguished between: accountability of the leaders to their followers, or democratic accountability, as opposed to obligation of the office holders to be answerable to one another, which Professor Sklar would call "constitutional accountability."

Regardless of the polemical debate on the form of government that is demanded in the name of the "people," one may wish to put more emphasis on development -- a concept that embraces economic growth along with social development measured by a complex of indices.

One may have a constitution without constitutionalism as alleged by an African political scientist who talks of "simultaneous existence of what appears to be a clear commitment by African political elite to the idea of the constitution, and an equal rejection of classical, or at any rate, liberal democratic notion of constitutionalism."

One may think that the people in developing countries have been given a choice between a mirage of Francis Fukuyama's "end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government," and a form of command economy in which coordination of economic activity takes place through administrative means, economic agents and, in particular, production organisations which operate primarily by virtue of state directives.

The success of command economies, that transformed Singapore from a Third World country into a First World country, and South Korea from a poverty stricken country to a member of the OECD, are being cited. But then debate has also taken place, particularly relating to South Korea, on whether command economy practiced in that country did not subvert the market mechanism, and whether a different approach could not have produced quicker and better results with a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.

A Western political scientist (C. B. Macpherson) has constructed a strong anti-liberal argument on democratic foundations. He contends that though citizens can have greater freedom in enjoying material benefits in capitalist societies they are compelled to transfer their natural powers to economic overlords, thus having a syndrome of "majority transfer of power to minority population" that ultimately goes against the interest of the general public.

Macpherson's contention strengthens Henry David Thoreau's reluctance to transfer all political power to the elected representatives, lest they behave in the way that we have witnessed in Bangladesh in the last five years.

Bangladeshis are in the throes of confusion on the demand for election by political parties and uncertainty about the results that such an election would have in store for them. The string of successes of the interim government in various fields has created in the minds of the people so many expectations that this government may not be able to satisfy them in the short time that they have.

One may try to understand the limitations of the interim government in the energy sector, which can have multiplier effects on water supply and the price spiral, even if external factors are left aside. It would, however, be a truism to state that high price is a function of the income of the people, so arguing that the prices of essentials have also gone up in neighbouring countries (where peoples' income has also increased) does not carry much weight.

Perhaps the interim government may wish to adopt some of the measures recommended by the Center For Policy Dialogue (and published in the Daily Star), like governmental intention to maintain stability of prices of essential commodities; introduction of zero tariff for the essentials; introduction by NBR of specific flat rates per tonnage, replacing the existing tariff structure; increasing market agents at the import level to break the monopoly exercised by syndicates who have been fleecing the people of huge amounts by imposing prices that give them abnormal profits. As the CPD report is not yet a public document, one cannot but make only a preliminary observation of its recommendations and their rationale.

While the people should be aware that they are not deprived of "strategic coordination," i.e. a set of activities that people must engage in to win political power that authoritarian regimes end up doing by reaping the benefits of economic developments without giving the people political freedom. Bangladeshis should weigh the potential disadvantages of having an elected government without first building strong foundations of the institutions, and ensuring uninterrupted economic development that can support a sustainable democratic way of life.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.