Obviously, neither model fits the profiles of the last alliance government or any in the past, although a hybrid of the two was most desired. Ever since independence, special interest groups manipulated policy decisions for the benefit of the family and political cronies. Public officials were politicized to serve politicians' interest letting public service go astray. The worst was experienced during the tenure of the last corrupt alliance government. How could this happen?

In the American system, the fourth branch of government refers to a group that influences the other three branches, namely, legislative, judicial, and executive. This fourth branch encompasses the press (an analogy to the French Fourth Estate), which reflects the voices of the people and interest groups.

The notion that the media or press forms the fourth branch is rooted in the belief that the news media's mission, which is to inform the populace, is crucial to the proper functioning of democracy. The phrase "Fourth Estate" is often used to accentuate the independence of the press, typically when this is contrasted with the press as a "fourth branch."

The last elected government monopolized the legislative branch (the parliament) by relegating the opposition to the role of street protesters and politicizing the judiciary to carry out their wishes, thus bringing these two branches of government virtually under the wing of the executive branch.

The fourth estate -- the media -- was vilified and maligned, and journalists were routinely persecuted and murdered. The country's governance, then, was thus reduced to essentially one branch - "the executive branch" and the fourth state the media - was replaced by "family, friends, and party loyalists" who influenced governmental policies and decisions for personal interests.

A remarkable change transpired on January 11 when the reformist interim government took over the governance of the country backed by the state of emergency. The interim government has reformed the judiciary to function independently like never before. In the absence of the legislative branch, the "Fourth Estate" now encompasses the media, the people and the patriotic army. (The interim government acknowledged their accountability to the people -- meaning people's voices are a provisional proxy for the parliament).

The belief that the fourth state has achieved its long fought carte blanche is reinforced when the High Court on March 22 rejected a contempt petition against the Bangla daily Manabzamin which in its March 21 issue castigated the qualifications and integrity of some judges. Slighting the contempt petition, the justices championed that "the press is free and the judiciary is not above criticism." The HC also stressed that "democratic and constitutional institutions cannot flourish without freedom of press." What a wonderful thing to hear!

In a democracy, the role of electoral process is twofold: select the benign politicians and discipline the malign ones (rent seekers or wheelers and dealers) if they are elected. Conflicts distort the democratic process when the interests of voters and politicians diverge. If incumbents are identified as wheelers and dealers they're voted out of office in their re-election bid. However, false and fabricated information about candidates (often generated by crooked political rivals) easily engender distortions in electors' behavior and the emergence of a benign government becomes out of reach.

Voters typically don't observe the politicians actions or may be uninformed about their true qualifications and preferences. By electing such candidates voters inadvertently make an adverse selection. This leads to moral hazard dilemma, which arises when politicians engage in corruption. Both adverse selection and moral hazard arise because of the existence of asymmetric information between voters and the candidates.

The EC can screen politicians' electoral eligibility by examining the credentials they provide and also use various official sources (such as police reports, banking information, tax filings etc). But how would the information reach the potential voters?

Since only 7% people read daily newspapers, the most effective way disclosures about candidates can be disseminated to the general public are via TV, and radio broadcasts. The media can also gather undisclosed yet verifiable irregularities about candidates and publish them for voters' awareness.

In a study entitled, "Exposing Corrupt Politicians" (November 2005) Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan showed that access to information enhances political accountability.

The study involved random auditing of Brazil's municipal expenditures of federally-allocated funds. It estimated the effect of the disclosure of corrupt practices of local politicians upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections.

The analyses compared the municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after, and found that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re-election rates of mayors found to be corrupt. This effect became more obvious in municipalities where radio broadcast were present and higher levels of corruption were identified by the anticorruption program.

Recent work on political agency models that incorporate both moral hazard and adverse selection show that while greater access to information allows voters to better screen politicians; it might also encourage them to disguise their behavior from detection. Additionally, the effect of information disclosure on electoral success will also depend on the prior beliefs voters have about the incumbent's propensity towards corruption.

When our "little else qualified to do" politicians patronize themselves with the arguments that politicians must ultimately govern the country and not the "non-politicians" like the eleven advisers of the IRG, they're not forthcoming with their past failures and deficiencies as politicians.

Some even argue that the widespread public exuberance with the IRG may dissipate the same way as that happened with the regimes of the past military dictators. These arguments should be considered nonsensical ipso facto.

Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad each seized power in their turns, became autocrats, and then proceeded to create political parties with the run-away and unprincipled politicians from other parties. These parties basically served as little more than a "cash grab" for many of the run-aways and their courtiers. Col. Zafar Imam, (minister during both regimes) argues that, in light of the interim government 's clean and tidy governance, both BNP and JP are in the process of being rendered irrelevant.

In contrast to all previous governments, the interim government has been reforming the important institutions in order to decentralize power, and implementing a system of checks and balances to guard against a repeat of past misrule and corruptions.

The interim government is schooling us that a decent and well meaning government need not be led by politicians with experience in street protests, lock-outs, and corrupt practices. One simply needs to know what is good for the people, and have the knowledge and willingness to serve their interest altruistically.

Dr. Abdullah A. Dewan is Professor of Economics at Eastern Michigan University