The amendments vaguely proposed by Musharraf to Hudood Ordinance successfully divided most parties (including the ruling PMLQ); but the prospect of ARD and MMA working together to topple the Musharraf regime may have vanished. MMA cannot countenance any change in Zia-made Ordinances to further Islamise Pakistan. Overwhelming Muslim Pakistanis are not aware whether they had been insufficiently Muslim all these many centuries or they have become more purified Muslims since Zia promulgated them. Now, women of almost all shades of opinion want their scrapping, except of course those who agree with religious parties' view that Islamic jurisprudence and punishment, as drafted by Zia, cannot be tampered with.

ARD's largest party, PPP, wants abrogation of these Ordinances; other major party in ARD, PML(N), has gone along with PPP rather reluctantly in order to keep ARD united and is committed to overthrowing Musharraf by winning the 2007 elections; but it is not too enthusiastic about abrogating them entirely; some amendments "yes" but striking them down altogether, "no" seems to be their position. Musharraf keeps dangling the Damocles sword of amending these Islamic Ordinances by Parliament. Although, his supporters are a majority but they are also bitterly divided over the issue: PMLQ's leadership supports these Islamic Ordinances, while urban-based MQM wants these anti-women laws to go. Nobody knows if Musharraf will ever press the issue or even can this Parliament kill these Ordinances. Meantime, ARD and MMA stay divided, for ever trying to be united. There are also other tactics up the regime's sleeves.

Election in 2007 provides the context of these wranglings. All are maneuvering with a view to fare better in it. Wishful thinking by opposition or others apart, Gen Musharraf looks set to win the 2007 polls the way he won those of 2002. Army is now in full control of state apparatus. It knows how to win an election without forcing individuals to vote in a certain way. Most of the rigging is either pre-poll or post poll when nobody is looking at what the spooks are doing.

Gen Musharraf in beautifully answering the objection that in-office heads of state and or of government do not write their memoirs said something revealing: "I am not mad to wait for retirement; should I write my book after my death." In other words, he does not envisage any retiring; he proposes to remain in power till he dies (in office). That seals the fate of 2007 election; it will probably yield even better results than 2002 election did that put him on the great gaddi.

There has been much wishful thinking about foreigners -- the US, Commonwealth, and other worthies -- wanting democratic polls in 2007. First, his September visit to Washington has ensured Musharraf the US administration's unstinting support. That involves UK's support ipso facto. Also, Pakistanis want change; they will vote out Musharraf's lap dogs. Some put reliance on a neutral caretaker government and an independent Election Commission to ensure a free and fair election.

Pakistanis have so far seen five neutral caretaker governments and supposedly autonomous election commissions; results broadly showed that each time the Pakistani electorate voted the way the army chief of the day wanted. State apparatus, as now constituted, is a well-honed machine; it yields the results that the Mechanic-in-Chief desires. People should ask this simple question: who will choose the neutral caretakers or the "independent" CEC, for that matter? Why? by Musharraf, of course. The next question is: Can he afford to retire either from the army or leave the Presidential Palace? Obviously, he cannot: a dictator rides a tiger; he cannot dismount.

The opposition has to take this prospect seriously. They will be mighty surprised at the election results in the early days of 2008; the winners will confirm Musharraf's presidency up to 2012 -- and perhaps up to 2017, and maybe beyond. For opposition, there is no short cut. It is not that nobody knows how dictators can be dismounted. There are two main ways: one is to try to make a bloody Revolution. One would strongly advise against it. Why? because the net result of any bloody revolution is another and more powerful dictator's installation. The whole exercise is pointless. But the need for a revolution does not go away. Those who want to see people enjoy all freedoms will always opt for non-violent people's effort to set themselves free so as to reorganize society, economy and state in a way that will truly benefit them rather than the traditional elite groups.

Here a certain wrong misperception must be removed. Going in for a violent change is an easier, more effective and natural way of reacting. Natural it may be but effective or easy it is not. Most anti-democratic states employ their spooks to encourage young hot heads to take to violent opposition. Secret cells are easy to infiltrate, subvert, misguide and to crush them by state's greater and efficient violence. While open politics by reasoning is far more effective, though at first sight it seems to require a very very long time. This is not really true. Violent change can, and is, hijacked by fascistic dictators. Political education does not take too long and yields results more quickly, accidents apart.

Several conclusions follow for opposition in this country. A blanket unity of all anti-Musharraf forces is neither possible nor actually desirable. Unity among democrats and liberal elements is the need of the hour. But as long as, there is the military regime in power, a broad unity of all for an interim transition period should be worked for. This means two things: one, let an interim united front of those who want a regime change be created for only electioneering, with some agreement on what should immediately follow. Two, let there be a second election on purely party platforms soon after the first that may have been won by far too many parties with no clear cut common purpose. For a new government to reform the society, a clearly-delineated economic and social programme would be needed. This will necessitate a second election, say six months after the first, to determine which precise program do the people want.

This is what Nepalese opposition leaders had agreed on in view of their differences of programs. But conditions in Pakistan are different but not fundamentally. The specific Nepali methodology will surely have to be adapted: Here the initial election campaign can be for one-point: simple undefined democracy. But soon after the 2007-08 polls, especially when, if the opposition does not win, as one supposes will be the case, it would be desirable to continue the election campaign but on the basis of precise programs.

MB Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.