Was hers a "desperate" move to "save face", as her detractors say? Or was it a great "sacrifice", similar to her earlier refusal of Prime Ministership?

In all fairness, both descriptions are off the mark. In May 2004, Ms Gandhi spurned India's top job with all its glory despite having led her party to victory. Last week, she was on the defensive. The UPA deviously moved to get an ordinance issued to amend the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 and remove several posts from the definition of "office of profit" so they don't attract disqualification.

It's irrelevant to ask if the planned ordinance was only meant to exempt the chair of the National Advisory Council. The UPA behaved in a Machiavellian way. It didn't move a Bill. It aborted the Parliament session.

Ms Gandhi's resignation was a damage-control exercise. But it was performed with a flourish and helped her capture the moral high ground. Ambiguity still persists about one issue: was she a party to the ordinance move? Or did self-styled Sonia "loyalists" like Messrs Pranab Mukherjee, Shivraj Patil and H.R. Bharadwaj keep her in the dark?

The second seems likelier. Nevertheless, the impression has spread that the Congress hasn't played fair. When an MP (Jaya Bachchan) from a rival party was disqualified, many Congressmen gloated.

However, let's assume that Ms Gandhi was a party to the ordinance plot. It nevertheless redounds to her credit that she corrected course by quitting. When politicians who know how to be crooked play with a straight bat, we should welcome them.

Many people believe that Ms Gandhi's resignation is more a tactical gesture than a moral one. But they shouldn't fault good tactics which promote public accountability and cleaner politics. Good tactics are better than bad tactics even when motivated by self-interest.

Ms Gandhi's resignation underscores three lessons. First, the Congress must stop stealthily manipulating the political system. Its devious conduct in Bihar and Karnataka cost it power. Some state Governors appointed by it have proved as partisan as those appointed by the BJP.

The Congress didn't cover itself with glory by letting Mr Ottavio Quattaracchi withdraw money from a London bank in a cloak-and-dagger operation -- although he's an absconder in the Bofors case. Such moves will cost the party sympathy when its policies -- e.g. on foreign and security affairs and the economy -- are unpopular.

The UPA's record has disappointed many. Ms Gandhi's resignation will rejuvenate the Congress only if it takes recent events to heart and mends its ways.

Secondly, the BJP must give up its obsessive demonisation of Ms Gandhi. Its "foreign origins" campaign betrays unacceptable intolerance and xenophobia. It's not going down well with ordinary people, for whom Ms Sonia Gandhi is as much of an Indian citizen as the Karachi-born Mr Advani.

The BJP self-righteously attacks the Congress on the "office-of-profit" issue. But it's equally vulnerable. In Jharkhand, 11 of its MLAs hold offices such as parliamentary secretaries and heads of regional development boards and public-sector corporations. Besides, 10 BJP MPs have been named in offices-of-profit complaints.

Finally, India urgently needs to reform the offices-of-profit law. This will help all: 40-odd MPs from the Left to the Right are charged with holding such offices.

The rationale for disqualifying law-makers from holding such offices derives from the principle of separation of powers between the legislature and executive. If MPs and MLAs take up executive posts, they can't impartially scrutinise the executive and hold it accountable.

The principle is unexceptionable. The trouble is, "office of profit" hasn't been defined in the Constitution or in the 1959 Act. Ministers are excluded from the definition. Beyond this, the criteria are fuzzy. Parliament can exempt all or any "offices".

So the "office-of-profit" doctrine has been called a "legal fiction" involving arbitrary excess of legislative power. Anyone can make a complaint about a legislator and create trouble.

It's imperative that Parliament enact a comprehensive legislation in which the central criterion is separation of powers of the executive and legislature -- to allow both to function efficiently.

The 1959 Act is built on a case-by-case approach. It has been repeatedly amended to exempt more and more categories from disqualification, including opposition leaders, party whips, Sheriffs of three cities, members of the senate/executive committee of universities, members of the Scheduled Castes & Tribes and Minority Commissions, and of any official delegation sent abroad.

This doesn't settle the issue. For instance, the NAC isn't an office of profit. It's an "advisory" body, whose advice is not binding on the government. It's not a statutory "monitoring" committee, like the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Similarly, Ms Jaya Bachchan's appointment to the UP Film Development Council can't interfere with her parliamentary work.

Such exemptions from disqualification should be extended liberally to advisory bodies -- and genuinely functional committees. As Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer wisely observed in 1977: "Our Constitution mandates the state to undertake multiform public activities on a massive scale... [Given this], can we keep out of elective posts... an army of non-officials who are wanted in various fields not as full-time government servants but as part-time participants in peoples' projects sponsored by the governments."

What we must discourage and punish is the pernicious practice of appointing legislators to sinecures such as members of state corporations, regional development boards, cooperative banks, etc. Most state governments make such appointments to subvert the norm on cabinet size (not exceeding 15 percent of the legislature's strength) and "buy up" majorities.

Preventing this is part of the larger agenda of democratic reform. It must not be abused to settle political scores. But can India's MPs maturely evolve such a consensus?

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.