As for the first question, it is very difficult to say who is winning, but no one should be in any doubt as to who is losing in Iraq. It is Iraq and its people that are looking down the barrel of the gun in no uncertain way. This apprehension has been reinforced all the more after the very well planned destruction of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra, a highly venerated Shia shrine, as all shrines are, in Iraq; and the aftermath of the incident has all the recipe of a full-blown civil war in Iraq, more of which later.

There are basically three parties in the Iraq crisis that one must consider; first it is the Iraqis, who are unfortunately fractured (one hopes temporarily) into Shia, Sunnis, Kurds and the rest; and then a major factor is the occupation forces, or more specifically the US. It is very difficult to see any of the parties benefit from such a development as we are witnessing currently in Iraq. However, let us dissect the issue and see who could be behind the explosion and how does one benefit by the current situation.

Surely, the first finger of accusation naturally will be pointed at the minority Sunni community, who are also the major insurgent elements fighting the US and Western occupation of their country. And what could be the benefits to their cause that the Sunnis could expect from such an act of outrage? If it is to prevent the formation of a Shia dominated government in the center, then there are more serious dangers to the Sunnis themselves if a central government in Iraq fails to take off at all.

It cannot have missed the Sunni leadership that a central government in Iraq reinforced by the participation of all the sects in the running of the government in Baghdad has basically two positive consequences. That, it will, if other factors remain unchanged, ensure that Iraq remains one single political entity whatever may be the character of its future political make up. Two, it will, hopefully, see the end of the occupation of Iraq since the major rationale of the presence of US forces will cease to exist. For the Sunnis their priority should be to see a modicum of political stability first and then the end of occupation rather than the reverse. If it is the end of the occupation that they want to ensure first, it will be foolhardy under then present scenario, to use insurgency as a means to drive out the Americans. Insurgency is but a phase of a revolutionary war that leads up to open hostility. And since it will not be a win-win situation for either the insurgents or the US forces, there is likely to be a stalemate, and one is nor sure whether the insurgents have any credible plans or any degree of strength to take on the US forces in the manner that the final phase of a classical revolutionary war entails, open hostility, and win.

And if it is the reverse they want, regrettably, we will only see the continuation of the vicious cycle, with the Americans finding the justification for further perpetuating their presence in Iraq, and the insurgents going about their destructive acts, that can hurt the Iraqis only. Thus it is very difficult to see any strategic advantage flowing from the destruction of religious shrines except that it will drive the wedge further in the prospects of reconciliation between the two major religious sects in Iraq. Whoever benefits from the fallout, it will certainly not be the Sunnis.

It is also very difficult to see any advantage of a political strife, which results in the breakup of the country, accruing to the Kurds. It is true that the Kurds were fighting against Saddam for political redemption. And although they flaunted the demand of freedom, the Kurds are not that diffident not to realise the complexity of such a demand, since their nationality straddles several countries in the region whose governments have been as much rigid on the Kurds issue as the Iraqis, if not more. And the Kurds, the leading figure among them being the current Iraqi President, who had one time been a leader of a Kurd nationalist group fighting the Saddam regime, realise that the current political dispensations made to them by the American could not have been any better. It does not need a political scientist to predict that in the present circumstances an independent Kurdistan is destined for unmitigated disaster.

Some analysts are given to believe that it is the US who stands to gain most out of the Shia-Sunni divide and also by the confrontation that they are engaged in against each other. They both being at each other's throats provides the US forces with the much needed respite, now that the US forces will not be the main target of the Sunni spite. However, I cannot see the benefit of engendering a full-scale civil war that will embroil the US even more, and is something that will eventually get out of control. Admittedly, a psychologically and politically divided Iraq has several advantages for the Americans. And it is more to do with the access to its resources than the physical occupation of Iraq. For the US, Iraq is the golden goose, but the benefit is in seeing a politically stable Iraq rather than the one that we are witnessing now. Thus, to impute that the US interest lies in continued violence and to therefore suggest its complicity in the latest shrine blast defies logic.

Coming to the question of: "Is Iraq going down the civil-war path?" the answer seems to be obvious. I cannot believe that people are wondering still whether Iraq has the makings of a civil war! It is not only going down that violent path, the reality is that a civil war has been raging in Iraq for more than two years. All this while, the Sunnis were on one side of the conflict; the Shias had been deliberately restrained from getting embroiled in it. And all this while it did not appear as a civil war because the Shia religious leadership was successful in restraining their sects from taking up arms; and it was the US forces that were fighting the Sunnis for the Shias. It appears that that restraint may have all but dissipated.

Hardly ever have we seen a situation where all the concerned parties were facing the prospect of losing the war.

The author is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.