Rumours started when Maulana Fazlur Rehman and JI Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed were first confined to their houses and within hours the order was countermanded and they were permitted to lead scheduled demos to protest against the Danish cartoons and also against the Musharraf regime. One finds no reason to expect any major change soon.

The rumours implied there was a section in the High Command that ordered the arrest and there was another, maybe President Pervez Musharraf himself, that changed it. That was all the proof of high-level differences. This is not logically established: the same man could have had second thoughts. A junior may have ordered the arrest and a senior one countermanded it. Too much need not be read into it.

Why? because the army remains tightly disciplined. Moreover, it has good reasons to stay disciplined. No senior general can defy, much less overthrow, Musharraf. All biggies stand to lose privileges that various dictators have given the senior military officers. Therefore no change can be expected, except in the case of very serious differences among generals. That is, when the bases of the military's power erode. No such change is likely or visible. Ergo, none should spread rumours.

True, there is much restiveness in the country. Most people see King Chaos coming. Some of the primary institutions of state are eroding fast. Look of things is not good. There is trouble in North and South Waziristan, not to mention Bajour Agency. The Danish cartoons have been a trigger for mass demonstrations, a few violent. The trigger has released the pent up anti-regime feelings. The regime is unpopular throughout FATA and not in Tribal Agencies alone. NWFP as a whole displays much disaffection.

The traditionalist tribesmen love the religious right. All Muslims are touchy about their Prophet's sanctity. Perception of insult to his memory sends people into uncontrollable rage. This is a given. Muslims tend to become violent if an insult to the Holy Prophet is involved. Protests against Danish cartoons are doubly intense because they also serve as a channel through which pent up feelings are being expressed.

NWFP and tribal areas being under rightwing religious parties' influence, many tribal areas have also come under the stifling influence of Taliban or even al-Qaeda. The area is alarmingly restive and it is growing. But the Musharraf regime somehow remains sanguine about Pushtoon restiveness.

Look at Balochistan. An insurgency of sorts -- low-level and intermittent it may be -- is a fact of life. Not a day passes, when some grievous violation of law and order is not reported. Authority is at war with at least Bugti and Marri tribes. Sabotage is the preferred Baloch way of registering protest, not that exchanges of rocket fire do not take place every now and then. Both sides suffer casualties. Disaffection with Islamabad is widespread over who is to control the province's resources.

Islamicists are not absent from Balochistan. Any number of Taliban and al-Qaeda elements seem to have found refuge in Balochistan. The government however is sure that India and the Karzai regime are behind some of the troubles in Balochistan. It is hard to be sure about this charge. It is conceivable that the Manmohan Singh government and Karzai regime are paying Pakistan in its own coin. Both complain that terrorists are crossing over into their respective domains from Pakistan. So if they are involved -- not necessarily provable -- it can be understandable. Both sides can be equally guilty. But blaming outsiders for domestic troubles is generally an excuse by security agencies for their failures.

Time was when Americans were being accused of inspiring Baloch separatism: some still hold them responsible. But given the regime's international role, it is hard to believe that the Americans would undermine Musharraf's regime. Because, if the Musharraf regime is overthrown, the country will lurch into more serious troubles. That will cause more troubles to great powers. Few major foreign powers, India included, can afford to destabilize Pakistan.

People are groaning over the level of inflation during the last two years. It is continuously at 7 to 9 per cent virtually per week. Life is ever harder, with mutton at Rs.260 or beef at Rs.130 per kg. Sugar is at Rs.42 per kg. Ghee has kept pace. Wheat flour is at Rs.170 per bag of 10 kg. Vegetables and fruit prices are in stratosphere. The common man meets the state in the shape of taxmen, policemen, security agencies and local mandarins. This encounter usually results in currency notes changing hands. The state's visage is not benevolent. People are only conscious of the lower bureaucracy's refusal to do its duty without a bribe. The distant central government does not signify commoners.

Why ignore the rampant anti-American feeling? This predates the Danish cartoons, of course. American foreign policy is widely disliked. Its espousal of Israeli security and what the Israelis are doing to the Palestinians are debit entries in the ledger. America by reducing Afghanistan to rubble and smoking out of the Taliban regime has not endeared itself to any Pakistani; even the secular and pro-democracy forces find it aggressive.

What they have done in Iraq is again to destroy a state, possibly for ever through civil war. There may never be a united Iraq again. That tragedy does not concern Arabs alone. It means the jungle law for all states. What the Americans have done to Pakistanis is to sustain a line of dictators from Ayub Khan down to this day. Aid, regular or for disasters, does not exuse that. Pakistan's democracy was killed by its own bureaucracy in collusion with Americans way back in early 1950s. The Americans were interested in acquiring stooges. They succeeded and Islamabad has always been ruled by American stooges. Americans should not expect the Pakistanis to thank them for this. True, their aid has been considerable. But to whom has it gone? How much has it benefited the common man? These are also debit items.

Change is the law of the nature. Pakistan too will change. But when is not clear. For many years to come, the Army is ensconced in power. Most generals remain faithful to their chief for solid reasons. The army discipline is a necessity for the privileged senior officers. So long as Musharraf regime does what it has been doing -- viz. to heap privileges on the army officers -- the discipline of the army will remain tight. Thus no change is likely in near future.

True, history abhors long dictatorial regimes. But history never announces when will which change occur. We can talk of pre-conditions. The main pre-conditions are: there has to be a countervailing force to the military and a leadership to lead it. Common people, poor and disorganized as they are, constitute that force. But do PPP, PML(N) or MMA, constitute the required leadership? Benazir Bhutto, the eminence rogue of PPP, totally relies on the Bush administration to put her PPP in power. What PML(N)'s Nawaz Sharif relies on is a trifle unclear. Is he any different in mentality from MMA? Can they mobilize people and lead them in the struggle for dislodging the army from power?

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.