Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 5 Num 624 Wed. March 01, 2006  
   
Editorial


Bottom Line
Why is President Bush visiting India?


In 1978, it was US President Jimmy Carter who visited India. The second visit took place in March 2000 by President Clinton, although the president's visit was almost jinxed because of America's presidential campaign, India's volatile politics, and US wrath over nuclear tests in 1998.

George Walker Bush will be the third US President to visit India for a three-day trip starting today, March 1. The purpose of the visit is to consolidate the new spirit and content of a strategic partnership with India. The US and India were not natural allies during the Cold War, but both countries were able to shed the straitjacket of Cold War positions after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the trip, he is expected to initiate a crucial civilian nuclear cooperation program with India provided it is separated from military program. Even it is signed it needs approval of the US Congress. The program will provide India a great leap forward in getting energy from nuclear source.

Both countries face new realities at the beginning of the 21st century and it seems their strategic interests coincide, reinforced by oil diplomacy and the the war on terrorism. The new interests have confirmed Lord Palmerston's dictum that countries have permanent national interests and not friends.

The US is a South Asian player to secure its own geopolitical ends. As the lone superpower, it must ensure its status against all challengers, real or potential. The second administration of President Clinton (1997-2000) had a fresh look at some of basic underpinnings of Indo-US relations. During his visit in March 2000, he seemed to convey clearly that a strong India was good for the US, a democratic and prosperous India was good for the US.

For the US, India is the only country that can contain China's power in the Asia Pacific region. The US needs India, a democratic country that stands at the centre of the Indian Ocean, reaching out from the sands of Egypt to the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are part of the Indian Ocean system where more than 50 percent per cent of the world's known reserves of crude oil are located. There is an added dimension to the Indian Ocean because of its militarization. For all of these reasons, the US needs India.

The US policy makers are happiest when they can combine strategic objectives with economics. India's economic liberalization since 1991 has come to stay because it is evolutionary and as former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao used to say "it is not a one-time inspiration from God."

One of the deciding factors for the US is the economic revolution in India that promises two-fold impact. It can give India the means of securing regional power with all its corollaries. Second, it makes engagement attractive for the US businessmen who profoundly shape US policy-making.

If strategy and commerce are the two factors that guide American foreign policy, oil is its third, and the war on terror, after 9/11, has been added as well. In all of these India can of great help.

There is another dimension to Indo-US relations. It is the Israel factor. Applying Kautilya's ancient wisdom about the enemy's enemy to the friend's friend, the US applauded when the Vajpayee government normalized its relations with Israel. Israel has been one of the strongest allies of the US in the Middle East. The Director General of the Israeli Defence Ministry visited India in 2001 when both sides discussed and agreed on defence cooperation. The sale of Israeli Arrow- 2 anti-tactical ballistic missile system, the Phalcon airborne warning and control system and other equipment demonstrates an Israel-India-US axis has been emerging in the region.

On the other hand, India realizes that it cannot achieve the status of regional power comparable to that of China without American cooperation. It is a fact that the previous Vajpayee government has contributed greatly to this emerging relationship, when his government began to take stock of changing geo-political scenario.

In return, India must give the US an economic stake and must always respond to situations that are in the national interest of the US. Politics and economics are interlinked. Political ties affect economic relations.

Pakistan remains India's bugbear. For a long time the US prevented the replication in South Asia of the relationship that maintains the balance and stability of the North and South American continents. The US strengthened China to counter the Soviet Union and China armed Pakistan. Suspicions existed during the 1980s that the US looked to Pakistan as a replacement for the Shah's Iran.

While visiting Pakistan for a short trip, India thinks that President Bush may persuade Pakistani military leader President General Pervez Musharraf to accept India's due role for regional peace and stability. The US has to induce Pakistani leaders to come to terms with the geo-political importance of India. They have to impress on Pakistan that India poses no security threat to Pakistan because it is secular, pluralist, and democratic.

The US may emphasize on Pakistan that it should realize that India's own security is so closely tied up with Pakistan and that Pakistan should be able to sort out internal political instability and achieve democracy. That means the US will have to tame Pakistan by not building up Musharraf as a hero and victim of terrorism.

In an interview on February 25, President Bush noted that he would raise the issue of terrorism with Pakistani leaders and would urge them to dismantle the apparatus of terrorism within the country. He also would urge both Indian and Pakistani leaders to resolve the fractious Kashmir dispute. It seems that it has fallen on the Bush administration to be in a position to "discipline" Pakistan, defuse the threat of India's retaliation, and avert another war in South Asia on Kashmir.

A few challenges remain for India. First, China's policy of improving economic ties with India while continuing defence cooperation with Pakistan presents the need for major diplomatic creativity on the part of New Delhi. Secondly, India cannot ignore the link between Pakistan and the US. The US will maintain warm relations with Pakistan so long as the war on terrorism continues, ignoring the continuation of an undemocratic regime. Third, recent voting pattern of India against Iran at the IAEA, ignoring the views of the left-wing members of the coalition government, raises the question as to whether the Manmohan Singh government has become too much aligned with the US for receiving US nuclear technology.

The question is: can India pursue an independent foreign policy? Some say that India sees no anomaly in vigorously pursuing strategic cooperation with the US, while buying cheap Russian arms, and mending fences with China. The bottom line is that the US needs India as much as India needs the US.

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose obsession with realpolitik overrode any ideological affiliation predicted that "Indian influence" would one day "radiate in the Indian Ocean and down to Singapore." It seems the Bush administration has seriously taken this prediction into account.

Barrister Harun ur Rashid is a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.