Pakistan's disappointments stem from the fact that since the warming of the relations between the two in 2003, the steps forward have been small and slow and despite all the noise of Confidence Building Measures India's stand on Kashmir remains the same as it was in 2003. During the third round of talks, New Delhi has emphasized its previous position by stating that "short of redrawing borders in Kashmir it is ready to consider all suggestions for a solution." By the same token, it also rejected Pakistani proposals such as Independence or Joint Control of the Himalayan region, or demilitarizing it and placing sections under United Nations mandate. India feels that giving up its territorial claims and accepting status quo is as far as it can go, whereas Islamabad's dilemmas stem from the fact that acceptance of such proposition flies flat on it self-conceived notion of national identity. And more critically, it undermines Pakistan's fifty years of national security and foreign policy goal. It feels that that after investing fifty years in trying to bring a change in Kashmir, Pakistan deserves some concessions. The crucial question is: in the face of Indian intransigent attitudes, can it afford to hold out indefinitely in order to have an amicable settlement? What options --coercive or persuasive -- does it have to make India change its mind?

By all counts, it seems that Pakistan cannot afford to opt for any coercive measures. Liberation of Kashmir has been the lynch-pin of its foreign policy since its creation in 1947. Resorting to conventional wars as policy instrument failed miserably. Three wars (1948, 1965, 1971), huge military build-up and procurement of nuclear arsenals, pursued at the cost of peoples' basic rights and needs, did not help. Consequently, Islamabad adopted a policy to keep India engaged militarily in Kashmir through its policy of Jihadi insurgency by giving support and training to militants in Indian held Kashmir. The policy was adopted in the context of large scale alienation of Kashmiri people of Indian rule that gave rise to an indigenous uprising in 1989 with Islamabad claiming that it was giving only moral and other support to the Kashmiri people's struggle for freedom. The argument held some truth. At the time, forums of Kashmiri separatist militants were indeed operating in the valley who sought help from Pakistan. They were termed as "freedom fighters" not "terrorists" -- fighting for Kashmiri people's right to self-determination. India accused Pakistan's alleged involvement in the insurgency by terming it as "cross-border terrorism" and confronted its Jihadi strategy with twin approach: holding the valley and the insurgency militarily while trying to reach for a political solution by bringing the Kashmiris into the political process.

The policy of recriminations brought India and Pakistan on the brink of war in 1999 and in 2001. Even the bilateral talks at the highest level during this period collapsed in mutual accusations and counter-accusations, making the prospect of Kashmir solution remote. Both held their respective grounds. Pakistan's Jihadi policy, however, began to be undermined due to the international terrorist attacks against America in September 2001. Existence of Islamic militants on both sides of Kashmir divide did not escape Washington's attention, as tackling international Islamic militant groups became top priority in US foreign and national security goal following September 11. Washington expected Pakistan, as its critical ally on its war on terrorism, to restrain these groups in the context of the ground rules of a state's responsibility for terrorist groups operating inside its borders that were laid by President George Bush in his United Nations speech in November 2001. Subsequently, Pakistan's insistence that Jihadies were Kashmiri freedom fighters and were only getting moral and other support from Islamabad was no longer tenable, especially in the wake of suicide bombings outside Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly in October 2002 and the terrorists attack on Indian Parliament in December 2002. In the backdrop of changed rules of the game and under pressure from US, President Pervez Musharraf conceded in his January 12, 2002, National Assembly speech that Pakistan would not allow Jihad in the name of Kashmir.

Pakistan's constraints in its Jihadi policy do not emanate from external pressure and changed international scenario alone. It arose from country's internal situation as well. The Government of Pakistan began to feel weary of the presence of these Jihadi militant groups within Pakistan's borders, who not only radicalized the society by giving rise to sectarian strife and political violence, but also turned against the government for its close link and cooperation with the US in its dealings with the Al Qaeda. The threats posed by these groups seemed so menacing that the President in his maiden speech in the National Assembly declared that "internal extremists" i.e. Islamic fundamentalists militias, not India, pose greatest threat to the state. Yet Pakistan cannot completely do away with its present path unless some progress is made on Kashmir conflict.

Pakistan, however, would invest heavily in playing its Washington card. It is a critical ally of US, who, for the first time, since India and Pakistan became independent, enjoys a unique position in South Asia. Its tilt towards India policy without abandoning Pakistan has paid off and its goodwill and friendship are sought by both South Asian rivals. The strategy serves their respective national interests -- India, in its quest for major power, and Pakistan for both domestic and external support, particularly in dealing with Indian threats. As US interest in South Asia is hampered due to Indo-Pakistan conflict, it has taken advantage of the situation and has been playing a pivotal role in defusing tensions and bringing them to negotiation table highlighting the fact that Washington, for the first time, has considerable leverage on both India and Pakistan. Islamabad feels that as a critical ally of US, it may persuade Washington to play a behind the scene role in nudging New Delhi to move towards a mutually honourable agreement on Kashmir. It should, however, be noted that US has definite limits in influencing India in this respect.

Actually, resolution of such an intractable and longstanding problem as the status of Kashmir will remain elusive unless Indians and Pakistanis have a change of heart about their neighbours. This can happen only if there is increased flow of people across the borders and more contacts in economic and cultural domains. Only mutual trusts, demilitarization in Kashmir, mutual defense cuts and due consideration of the hopes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people will pave the way for a lasting peace in Kashmir. Pakistan's option is to work towards that goal while keeping a close tie with Washington and hoping that United States would become a catalyst for change.

Dilara Choudhury is Professor, Govt and Politics, Jahangirnagar University.