Sunni rejection of the draft constitution does not mean their withdrawal from the political process. On the contrary, they have vowed to defeat the proposed constitution in the October referendum and to take part in the elections later this year. Though the Sunnis are a minority (about 17-20 percent of the total population), they have enough votes to defeat the constitution in the referendum. The document needs to be approved by 16 of Iraq's 18 provinces. If two thirds of the votes in any three provinces reject the constitution, then Iraq will have to hold new parliamentary elections and start drafting a new constitution from the scratch. There are three Kurdish and three Sunni Arab governorates. Even if the Kurdish leaders accept the Shia dictated constitution, Kurds could still reject it. Equally the Sunni Arabs could torpedo the draft constitution.

Predictably, President Bush expressed optimism about Iraq's future and downplayed the importance of rejection by the Sunnis of the draft constitution. He drew a parallel with the Philadelphia Convention (1787) in which some delegations refused to sign the draft which was vigorously debated in every state, and the final outcome was not certain till all theÊvotes were counted. Clearly the example of Philadelphia Convention underlying lack of unanimity and consequent debate being intrinsic to the democratic process was not an appropriate example because in 1787 US was neither a territory occupied by foreigners nor were the Americans ethnically and culturally divided as the Shiia, Sunni, Kurd, Chaldeans, and Turkmen in Iraq today.ÊProfessor Yitzhak Nakash, tracing the formative years of Shiite Islam in Iraq, observes that the division between the Siias and the Sunnis "are primarily political rather than ethnic and cultural and reflect the competition of the two groups over the right to rule. Whereas the Sunni ruling elite adopted a wider Arab nationalism as its main ideology, the Shiites have preferred Iraqi nationalism which stresses the distinct values and heritage of Iraqi society."

But differences between the Shias and the Sunnis run deep. There appears to be a deep rooted religious difference between the two sects of Islam. According the Yitzhak Nakash, unlike Sunnis who in theory are expected to obey their rulers andÊmay tolerate a tyrant to avoid civil strife and preserve cohesion of the Muslim Community, the Shias recognise no authority on earth except that of the Imam. Till the arrival of Imam Mehdi, the twelfth Imam, no human sovereign has total legitimacy. The question, therefore, arises if a Shia dominated society would have a natural tendency to establish a theocratic state.

In Iraq, where Shias constitute sixty percent of the population, the real power in Shiite Iraq rest with two religious parties: Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Supreme Council of Religious Revolution in Iraq (Sciri) and Dawa of Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafar. Both want Iraq to be an Islamic state, make Islam the principal source of law, would like to limit religious freedom of non-Muslims, etc. Indeed, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Shiite parties who gained effective control of the southern cities enforced conservative dress codes and banned alcohol and other un-Islamic behaviour. Such conduct reminds one of those practiced by the Islamist political parties governing in the Pakistani provinces of NWFP and Beluchistan.

In any discussion on the future of Iraq it would be unwise to ignore the behavioral pattern of regimes like Iranian theocracy and Islamist political parties in Pakistan.ÊIn theory Pakistan is an Islamic theocracy. The 1973 Constitution declares Islam as the state religion and sovereignty belongs to Allah. Nationally Islamisation is proceeding as a matter of constitutional obligation. Consequently, the democratic liberal section of the society is the main casualty.

In many ways, Jamat-e-Islami is the main architect of official Islam in Pakistan. Its founder Maulana Abu Ala Maudidi,s message of Islam was essentially coupled with power. "The ultimate aim of all the prophets' missions in the world has been to establish the Kingdom of God on earth and to enforce the system of life received from Him." Power and authority are thus prerequisites to enforce Islam. It is important to remember that in Pakistan, as in some other Muslim countries, madrasas and mosques are the basis of religious activism and politics.

In the case of Iran defying western predictions, theocracy continues to survive. Besides,Êthe fact that the overwhelming majority of Iranians were born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and have little spiritual affinity with theocratic rule, did not result in a resurgent reformist revival to contest the theocracy in power. Analysing the election of Mahmoud Ahmad-Nejad as the new President of Iran, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group found the reform movement in Iran to be in disarray, the reformers are disorganised, lack a strong leader, and have an eight year desultory record of failure to connect with the concerns of the common men. Ahmad-Nejad won against Hashim Rafsanjani, broadly disliked and perceived to be corrupt, as against Ahmad-Nejad who came across as a man of the people and who focused on the poor and their concerns of every dayÊ life. It is possible that under the new regime, however constricted the powers of the President may be, Islamist movement in the "soft" target areas could get encouragement if relations with the US takes a nose dive. Iran poses another matter of concern to secular values.

Like madrasas in Pakistan and Bangladesh, religious foundations (bonyads) control billions of dollars of assets. They enjoy monopoly status and benefit from a closed and isolated society, and engage in a range of activities including trade, commerce, manufacturing, social services, and political and religious propaganda. It would, therefore, appear that theocracy, be it of Shiite or Sunni variety, actively promotes religious schools producing large number of people erudite in theocratic scholarship, but of little use in a manufacturing world geared to serve a global consumer society.

Bush administration woes are further compounded by (a) the desire expressed by the two Shiite coalition to see Iraq as an Islamic state, (b) advocacy by the leader of the most powerful Shiite party to pay reparations to Iran for starting the Iran-Iraq war, and (c) signing of defense agreement with Iran to train Iraqi military officers to the dismay of the Bush administration.

As opposed to this scenario, Yitzhak Nakash feels that a large majority of Iraqi Shiites have no desire to emulate the Iranian theocracy. Besides, Iran does not have ethnic minorities as Iraq has, nor does Iran suffer from an internal debate among Shiite leaders whether to adopt the philosophy of quietism or political activism.

The situation is further complicated by the desire of the Kurds to be totally independent as they had expressed in the January referendum. In June, when President Jalal Talabani, himself a Kurd, went to inaugurate the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Iraqi national flag was conspicuously absent from the inaugural hall and the oath taken by the National Assembly members pointedly dropped any mention of Iraq from their oath.

Whether one goes by the conditionsÊto facilitate democratic transition laid down by Francis Fukuyama, Cato Institute's Patrick Basham, or of Council on Foreign Relation's Richard Haas (level of development, culture, neighbourhood effect, idea, political trust, social tolerance, recognition of the importance of basic political liberties, popular support for gender equality), one cannot but agree with the assessment of Larry Diamond who briefly served Paul Bremer that: "Iraq lacks virtually every precondition for democracy."

Understandably, the Bush administration, faced with the increasing ferocity of Sunni Arab insurgency, is perhaps exiting from its state of denial. The US, reports Washington Post, no longer expects to see a model democracy or a society in which a majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges. The Bush administration which set out to establish democracy in Iraq to enthuse other Arabs to follow suit may very well end up with an Islamic Republic. Additionally, shorn of its Arab identity, a fragmented Iraq surrounded by Sunni Arab neighbours may find itself in difficulty as many conservative Sunnis regard the Shiias as apostates.

In short, the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq may have liberated the Iraqis from the clutches of a tyrant, but has not given much to the Iraqis, either in terms of security or economic benefit. In the ultimate analysis, however much the Bush-Blair Iraq venture has been a mistake, the world has at least been warned of religious terrorism and Islamic extremism which does not distinguish between the rich and the poor, the developed and the underdeveloped societies, combatants and non-combatants, civilian men, women and children. These are the people we should be on the lookout for. These are the people who have to be apprehended and destroyed.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.