How would there be misfortunes for non-nuclear countries, if there is no war? That is a function of mistrust between India and Pakistan. The current deluge of protocol goodwill and fomenting a feel good factor by the two governments under American prodding has not removed their mistrust. Which South Asian can ignore it? Their worry is reasonable.

Pakistani nuclear missiles are ready to be fired at Indian targets. It means India will suffer a few cities' incineration. Also, if the Indian nukes stand ready to be fired at Pakistan, which will take only a few minutes to get destroyed. Neither side will have the time for defensives measures. In the east-west cold war available time for decisions was 27 minutes. Both could read blips on their radars as missiles or geese or some debris. In South Asia, a missile's flying time to its target is 3 to 5 minutes. No government can react in this timeframe and the scope for misunderstanding, wrong calculations and unauthorized launches by power-hungry groups or terrorists in both countries cannot be ignored.

Even if there is no war between the two adversaries and present no-peace-no-war situation continues, South Asians' future remains compromised. Because Indo-Pakistan mistrust preempts optimal regional cooperation. Fact is India and Pakistan have to remain at hair-trigger alert. If war does break out, some radioactivity is bound to fall on neighbours. And they would suffer for no fault of their own. For non-nuclear South Asians, both sets of nukes are a misfortune, requiring efforts to destroy them.

Some argue that EU is an example of regional cooperation and integration to follow. There are two EU members that are nuclear powers, viz. France and Britain. What is the rationale for French and British nukes? Apart from national grandeur or the desire to sit at the high table, the French and the British nukes are a strategic insurance policy against German power's resurrection. The Anglo-French nukes only make sense if Germany's aggressive instincts are assumed a priori.

Modern Germany accepts this Anglo-French apprehension and has chosen against ever becoming a nationalist or isolationist power. It has consciously anchored its revival in European entity away from pan-Germanic ideas that had led to three aggressions to 1939. Germany is happy to stay non-nuclear; Germans see their future in peace and look upon French and British nukes with part-unconcern and part-curiosity. EU example does not apply to South Asia.

Here, unlike Europe, the two nuclear powers look upon each other as bitter adversaries. About India there may still be a few illusions that once it becomes a world power with American support: it may still promote peace in Asia by cultivating Russia, China and other Central Asians simultaneously. Insofar as Pakistan is concerned, it has yoked itself to US irretrievably. It would do what America wants, without ifs and buts. Since both countries listen to US with respect, the two will be able to put in many more CBMs while the main disputes may not get unresolved. That situation is fundamentally unstable: some PR-oriented cultural exchanges may coexist with no basic change of orientation.

Other South Asians had better exhibit their preference for peace: one that promotes rapprochement between India and Pakistan, based on a resolution of disputes Kashmir, nukes and dams. Without resolution of disputes, resumption of hostile propaganda is waiting to happen. Both are capable of resuming confrontation. India and Pakistan being differently oriented, how can the South Asians read the deepening of dé

tente by CBMs as making Pakistan and India lasting friends? Why does a true Indo-Pakistan rapprochement looks difficult? Obviously what stand in the way is serious disputes.

This shows the current peace process to be shallow. Why? because it leaves out basic and highly emotional disputes. Thus fears of a possible war are not unwarranted in the rest of South Asia. It is for the Indians and Pakistanis to prove that there would be no war. They have to show it by the success of their Peace Process. One asserts that while Kashmir is likely to be left aside, and eventually disregarded, but not the nukes. They cannot be ignored. The very presence of nukes in India is an incentive to Pakistan to remain nuclear. If Pakistan remains nuclear, India's nuclear disarmament is impossible. Both want to utilize nukes for their advancement also: one wants permanent membership of the UNSC and the other wants to be a leader of Islamic countries.

The question of questions is what sort of Peace Process between India and Pakistan will, or can, succeed. There are forces in both societies that favour a lasting peace. Both governments have recognised popular pressures for peace. Both have called this peace process irreversible. But it is not, though it should be made so. Hitherto both bureaucracies have kept the peace process under strict control. Not one step has been taken that can enable popular aspirations and yearnings to reduce that control. Establishments running both states refuse to permit socio-economic realities free play. Establishments importantly include local versions of industrial-military complexes that require hostility between India and Pakistan.

These two contending forces are the entrenched establishments in both countries and common popular yearnings to be friends and ensuring peace and cooperation between the two countries. Which would succeed and when? Possibly, the popular sentiments will someday overwhelm the two establishments to make up and do the right thing about their nukes. Democratic and peace lobby has to clear the road to nuclear disarmament to make South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. When will popular forces overwhelm the establishments? It is not likely to be soon. Peace process is rather unsteady. That is due to entrenched vested interests in both countries. So far the two bureaucracies have had the last laugh; the visa regime is still restricted. Real concessions continue eluding.

Do South Asians deserve this Democle's sword over their heads? Obviously they don't. They are peace-loving and cannot be accused of doing anything that will disturb international peace. A possible India-Pakistan war is sure to affect them adversely. Indeed their ecology and climate might change, temporarily one hopes. But physical consequences include being subjected to radioactive rains and other consequences for unspecified time.

Even the present no-war-no-peace between India and Pakistan is adversely affecting South Asians. Why? because so long as India-Pakistan confrontation lasts, there would be no real regional cooperation and eventual integration. What the South Asians need are regional grids of communications, power, oil and gas, weather forecasting, investments and free trade, more cultural exchanges, regional arrangements to watch over human rights violations and may be regional courts to enforce human rights and so forth. Today, this the starry-eyed idealism and power brokers in India and Pakistan will say is unrealistic. Establishments have to preserve conditions in which they enjoy large budgets, respect and autonomy. That promises advancement and riches to power brokers. Would other South Asians help the embattled peace lobbies of Pakistan and India in the common cause of peace and progress for commoners?

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.