In a prime time televised address in Dec 2003 Pervez Musharraf gave what amounted to a solemn pledge that he would retire as COAS on or before Dec 31, 2004 because of an understanding reached with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to break the impasse on the 17th Amendment. The President has now gone back on his public commitment and therefore enmeshed himself in a major credibility problem when there was no need to do so. Because of late Gen Ziaul Haq's notorious "90 day commitment" which Zia did not keep (and had no intention of keeping), the public suspects the credibility of military rulers making any such promises. Pervez Musharraf certainly can make a case for not adhering to his volunteered commitment since the MMA only partly kept their reciprocal commitments. One would have been far more comfortable if the President had refrained from making any public announcement, and if he had to do so then he should have made the doffing of his uniform conditional on the MMA keeping to their side of the bargain.

Since the world (which comprises the US and its Coalition partners in the "war against terrorism") is quite comfortable with Pervez Musharraf running a "uniformed democracy", there is no international compulsion on him to gamble with things contrary. In any case we are past-masters at frequently sacrificing morality at the altar of necessity. When asked about Musharraf not leaving the post of COAS as promised, the US Secretary of State referred to the Parliamentary process that had allowed Musharraf to keep both the post of President and COAS, to quote Powell, "it is not a matter for the US but of the Pakistanis". The US-led world has differing standards at different times for different countries with respect to democracy, our present mode of democracy fits into their scheme of things, albeit for both national and international security reasons. Logically, even though Pervez Musharraf's continuity in both offices is contingent upon the security environment, given that the west is presently under threat of international terrorism, should we have generals running western democracies? It may not be logical in the purest sense to have a uniformed man as a Head of State of any democracy, in the face of Islamic extremism breeding terrorism, the west has decided that to be logical is not to be always right.

Pervez Musharraf has certainly made mistakes, the major being the holding of the Referendum when there was no need to do so. The second being the failure to transfer power to those elected, even after a grossly manipulated election. He was forced to become beholden to the very party his intelligence men artificially created in the first place. Heavens would not have fallen if the PPP would have come to power in Sindh and led a Coalition government at the Federal level. Retaining the Defence Ministry (and thus control of the ISI) and the NAB, he would have remained an all powerful non-executive Head of State. However signs now point to a national government in the making in the future, a coalition of liberal forces to politically match the religious parties that are ascendant in some areas on our western and northern borders. Pervez Musharraf's ability to compromise where and when necessary is an asset to the country, consider his U-turn on the Talibaan after 9/11. He saved Pakistan from becoming one giant parking lot!

Pervez Musharraf successes in the years since 1999 are many (and not only since 9/11), more particularly in the economic field where growth rate is exceeding 6 per cent and is targetting 8 per cent in 2005-2006. The economy has not only greatly stabilised but is ripe for exploitation by entrepreneurs, however inflation at 9 per cent is a matter of concern as is the "poverty alleviation programme" with rewards still not "trickling down" to the downtrodden and hopelessly poor. His biggest success (and a measure of his personal confidence) was in not outrightly imposing martial law publicly, even though he has run one in all but name. This gave the perception to the public of benign authority, this force-multiplied perception by allowing of unprecedented freedom of the media. With freedom of expression manifest as an article of faith, the military took a calculated risk in allowing the letting off of steam and thus avoiding a pressure cooker situation ripe for exploitation by recalcitrant politicians, concerted and widespread street protest never materialised. This really smart move of allowing such freedoms must be a first for any military rule, it has singularly contributed to Pervez Musharraf's acceptability by both the intelligentsia and the masses.

A few cynics dismiss this apathy among the public as born out of resigned frustration at their hapless fate, that is too simplistic!

One of Musharraf's lasting legacies is the instituting of accountability, one only wishes it had been across the board. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has done an excellent job in targetting businessmen, bureaucrat and politicians, etc in not touching the superior judiciary and/or the Armed Forces its credibility has been badly undercut. Moreover the "plea bargain" concept is an invitation for legalising corruption. A handful among the superior judiciary and the military hierarchy, both serving and retired, have a vested interest in Musharraf retaining the COAS post, NAB under any future regime will certainly institute cases against them, one serving Lt Gen and one recently retired one have a lot of real-estate Shenanigans to answer for! Which brings us to the question of trust! All officers from the rank of Brigadier onwards in the Army have been personally selected and promoted to his present rank by Pervez Musharraf. By not retiring as the COAS, he is giving a profound vote of "no confidence" to the very generals he has appointed to positions of trust. There is an aberration afflicting our national culture and psyche, having long service in the Army and being the son of a bureaucrat, Pervez Musharraf understands that psyche only too well, a retired man is a nobody, or nearly so. Ask those poor frustrated pensioners of two decades ago running from pillar to post for increases in their pensions just to keep on living. The moment he doffs his uniform, the "movers and shakers" in Pakistani politics, bureaucracy, business and the Armed Forces, etc will start beating a path to the door of the newly incumbent COAS, whoever he is.

Pervez Musharraf may not have done everything right, but in relative comparison to the political leaders who once ruled us, he has done reasonably well in the mode of his governance. The Catch-22 is that this is certainly not a happy situation, "uniformed democracy a la Musharraf" may be suitable for Pakistan for the moment, it does not bode well for our long-term survivability as a sovereign nation. A President in the uniform of the COAS Pakistan Army creates an unhealthy precedent for adventurers in the future. For the sake of this nation, Pervez Musharraf must come to terms with this reality (and his place in history thereof) sooner than later.

Ikram Sehgal, a former Major of Pakistan Army, is a political analyst and columnist.