iers indulged more often than not, in this deadly game. So much so, that an ambitious prince did not even spare his old infirm father from the captivity. Remember the plight of Shahjahan, the great Mughal of Platonic love? The palace plots and intrigues are the coining of the people and the Pakistanis seemed to be perfectionist of the arts.

Much before the much-vilified military polluted the politics of Pakistan the master intriguers like Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza already did the job with great success. They were able to nip in the bud the great possibility of Pakistan emerging as a parliamentary democracy for which it had enormous potentials. It inherited from vibrant Bengal politics of pre-

partition days the gifted and outstanding parliamentarians of the stature of Suhrawardy, Tamizuddin Khan, Khawja Nazimuddin and AK Fazlul Huq who could be of no avail in Pakistan's ensuing polities which was murky and sleazy at the best. The dream of a democratic Pakistan was already in tatter before the

military stepped in 1958. The military rulers followed the scripted way learnt from the assorted Muslim rulers of Delhi -- an endless trickery and chicanery but learnt not a bit from where actually their greatness lay.

Both Ayub Khan and Ziaul Huq, two of Pakistan's most agile military rulers instinctively knew how to cling to power even in absence of international and domestic support

and they surpassed each other in their guile to acquire legitimacy where needed. It was the high noon when Ayub came handy to the Americans who liberally obliged on the basis of well crafted quid pro quo. The lack of Ayub's democratic credential did not come in the way. The Afghan war in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a windfall of opportunities that was fully availed of by Ziaul Huq.

Now out of the US' comprador allies in the crisis-zone of international terrorism stretching from the Middle East to the southern tip of central Asia General Musharraf's post 9/11 behaviour gave little cause for dismay. Reciprocally Islamabad too is disinclined to raise any awkward question before its patrons.

Therefore, when a bizarre 'uniform debate' (over whether general Musharraf will or won't don his military uniform henceforth) had been raging in Pakistan, the impression was already created that the President would retain his uniform on account of 'popular pressure.' Earlier this month none other than

President Musharraf himself made the extraordinary claim that 96% of Pakistanis want him to keep his 'uniform'. By the time of last week's Washington Post interview it has adjusted downward to a 'vast majority.' But both the claims are vague and unsubstantiated.

On October 12, 1999 Musharraf had "moved as a last resort to save the country" and he is still at it with absolute power for last five years,

with the seven-point agenda he announced at the time of take over. Midway through the last five year he however added another point to his agenda: eliminating terrorism from the face of the earth. And it has perhaps been the last task that has engaged most of his attention. Of course this task has made it a lot easier for Musharraf to revive, to an extent, his country's economy. But here to the continuous constraint of foreign investors to take Pakistan seriously. As a result it is almost impossible for Musharraf to show any meaningful progress on the economic front.

Despite Musharraf's modest success here and there, thanks to the 9/11 related US' generous economic assistance, Musharraf seems to be suffering from 'destiny' syndrome and now he has got the impression that the country would be destroyed if he put off the 'uniform' -- a typical problem perhaps with every dictator. Suffering from an overdose of confidence Musharraf like his predecessors in uniform, seems to be deriving and drawing those confidences obviously from Washington. There is a vital difference, the sovereigns of Delhi had however there self generated confidence.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.