The issue of small arms has always been a big problem but only events like August 21 brings it to focus.

Illicit proliferation of SA&LW has emerged as a threat to economic and sociopolitical security in the national, regional, and global context. Regrettably, the phrase "small and light" trivialises the lethality of such arms, when in reality their destructive capacity ranges from frightening to actual killing of innocent people. More lives have been lost from the effect of SA&LW through sub-conventional and internal conflicts, in which these weapons were the handiest tools, than in conventional conflict where "large" weapons were used.

These two terms are misleading, serving as a euphemism for large-scale carnage that they are capable of causing. The harmful impact of these weapons on our society and national security at large is neither light nor small. In an ex-post sense, the effect on our society is far more devastating than "big arms" and "heavy weapons." The impact is not only physical, but also psychological and societal, and therefore lasts longer. The profound impact of the August 21 bears this out.

Although we had been living under the shadow of "large" weapons, mankind is very much the worse for wear due to the internal and sub-conventional conflicts and militancy stemming from ethnic aspirations. Terrorism and use of terror tactics by various groups and the social and political violence, has mutated into an adverse security situation for Bangladesh.

But, whereas there has not been a large scale use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since August 1945, (except in the Iran-Iraq war and on Halbja and Pinjwin) the world is seized with the issue of WMD, where sovereign countries are being invaded on suspicion of its possession, and where international laws are being flouted by making WMD an excuse for aggression. Absence of any international treaty or other legal instruments for dealing with these weapons, unlike nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, compounds the problem further.

Let us put the matter in perspective by considering some statistics. By one account, seven hundred thousand people are killed annually by small arms fire alone. Because they are inexpensive, simple to use and portable, small arms lower the barrier for violence and terror. Their widespread availability multiplies their lethal effectiveness and makes conflict easier. This is what makes small arms not only weapons of mass terror -- they are actually the weapons of mass destruction.

"Small arms" is big business too. According to one report, nearly seven million commercial handguns and long guns were produced during 2000. About 75 percent of these were made in the US or the European Union. At least 98 countries can or do produce small arms and/or ammunition. Around 16 billion units of ammunition were produced during 2001. The global small arms stockpile is estimated at 639 million guns. Approximately 59 percent of this arsenal is in the hands of civilians -- over 377 million weapons. The government armed forces, police, insurgents and other non-state actors own the remainder. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- France, Russia, China, the UK, and the US -- together account for 88 percent of the world's conventional arms exports. By another estimate, illicit arms transfer represent at least 50 percent of the total licit international trade, the annual value of which is between three and six billion USD.

It would be running a fool's errand to try to determine the source of these illegal weapons, which are, in fact, many. In most cases quite legitimately produced and procured weapons find their way into illegal transactions through many loopholes not least of which is the improper use of the end user certificate. Small arms are proliferated through both legal and illegal trade.

Easy availability of small arms is what empowers the sub-state and non-state actors. The consequence is the weakening of the state's power and authority. Analyses of scholarship on this issue indicate that sophistication and technological developments favour the terrorists and sub-state actors rather than the government. The upshot of sophistication is the high casualty rates that these weapons are able to inflict.

Insofar as South Asia is concerned, the terrorists and militants have a qualitative edge over the government forces because of the type of small arms and light weapons they possess. Compare the weapons that were hauled up in Chittagong with those that are held by our security agencies and the asymmetry will be clear.

The predicament that governments find themselves in is that, as more and more sophistication in small arms and light weapons are sought by them, and as more such weapons are developed, more and more are these diffused to non-state and sub-state actors, shifting the asymmetry, that should ideally exist in favour of the state, towards the other side. The state is put at a disadvantage.

The important question is, can small arms diffusion be stopped altogether?

It may be difficult to stop the diffusion completely. However, Any attempt to curb the phenomenon must take into account the supply as well as the demand side of the equation. One cannot possibly put a cap on the supply side if there are end users at home willing to go to any lengths to acquire these weapons. The causes that motivate demand must be addressed and those factors that exercise duress causing its increased supply must be taken into account to make any control measures workable. Both social and political factors generate demand; in the case of Bangladesh both factors need to be addressed in equal measure.

In Bangladesh, as indeed in the rest of the region, there is a symbiotic relationship between politics and small arms. Small arms have become the arbiter of differences and settling of political scores. Armed militant groups of various shades have easy access to these weapons. That these elements in Bangladesh enjoy political patronage have become patently clear from the confessions of several leaders belonging to hard core criminal groups, apprehended by the security forces in the last few months.

Poor governance has much to answer for the increased weaponisation of our society and the endemic societal violence. When a government fails to ensure fair play, when lack of empowerment stifles human growth, when needs and demands of various elements are overlooked, pockets of discontent begin to appear. They seek to redress the imbalance, perceived or real, by use of force, and weapons acts as an efficacious supplement.

What is often lost sight of when one talks about SA&LW is the natal link between drugs and small arms. There are common characteristics of these two phenomena, one supplements the other and each often generates demand for the other.

What escapes our notice also is the fact that there are close trans-frontier linkages between the dealers of small arms and drugs. The synergy is deep rooted and pervasive.

The problem, being multidimensional, demands a multidimensional approach. While the aspect of physical security predominates the discourse of this issue it would be a folly not to take into account the humanitarian development related component of the matter.

Two important aspects emerge from this issue. First is the universality of the problem, i.e. it cannot be combated in isolation by individual states, but will require the cooperation of the world community, particularly the neighbours. Second and equally important aspect is that it must be tackled in a comprehensive manner where development and security will be synonymous and their objectives coterminous.

The author is Editor, Defense and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.