The present discourse, however, is not on British politics of today or tomorrow. The objective of this piece is to understand whether the criticism of the transatlantic intelligence (and indeed of the G-8) is not a veiled endorsement of historian Bernard Lewis' interpretation of "Muslim Rage" which according to Lewis originated in the clash between Christendom and Islam when the Muslims were humbled from the height of their glory by the "inferior Christians and Jews" and resulted in the "millennial rivalry" between the two world religions. Bernard Lewis' words must be taken seriously particularly by the Muslim world, not only because of his outstanding intellect and vast knowledge of Islamic history, but also because, in the words of Ian Burton (The New Yorker): "His best-selling book What Went Wrong about the decline of Muslim civilisation is regarded in some circles as a handbook in the war against Islamic terrorism . . . and if anyone can be said to have provided intellectual muscle for the recent United States' policy towards Middle East it would have to be him."

The reports of the Anglo-US inquiry commissions in the aftermath of Iraq invasion appear to have excluded moderate Muslims' concerns in the enthusiastic pursuit of al-Qaedist terrorism through socio-cultural exclusion of the entire Muslim community and barricading the West within its borders. Little thought has been given that such behaviour runs counter to the essence of western libertarian values and echoes Bernard Lewis' remarks that "democracy is a parochial custom of the English speaking people for the conduct of their public affairs, which may or may not be suitable for others." Such condemnation of people who might not have reached the post-industrial and post-modern stages of economic development smacks of self-satisfied arrogance.

As an example, detractors have pointed out that if Islamist radicalism is a threat in Pakistan it is not because of the "millennial rivalry" between the two world religions, but because of Pakistan's history of authoritarian rule by a small land-owning class and military junta. Equally, because of age old autocratic tradition in many Arab countries it is suspected that there is no guarantee that democracy experiment will succeed in those countries, and even if it does for how long. It is often forgotten that the emergence of great number of Hobbesian islands of autocracy could not have been possible without the active support of the western powers who were more interested in ensuring uninterrupted oil supply and con-

tinuance of military bases than in fostering democratic values in those countries. The current western preoccupation with Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam is due to their realisation that policies followed hitherto had given birth to several failed states in the vacuum left by the demise of the Cold War which helped incubate the vitriolic contagion of al-Qaeda variety (in Afghanistan from where the Soviets were driven out).

In panic after the tragedy of 9/11, the West has equated Islamic fundamentalism with political Islam. While Islamic fundamentalism encapsulates the emotional, spiritual, and political response of the Muslims to the acute politico-economic crisis in the Middle East; political Islam aims at establishing a global Islamic order through challenging the status quo within the Muslim states and through establishing a transnational network of contacts. It is generally recognised that fundamentalism in the sense that it depicts one's attempts to return to one's pristine and primordial beliefs is neither Islam-specific nor is to be feared per se. It is only when Islamic fundamentalism transcends its boundary of quietism into political arena to establish its creed through violence imbibed with absolutist, inerrant and arrogant confidence in the supremacy of its belief over other beliefs, that it becomes necessary to confront such a violent movement. Western confusion over monolithic Islamic menace has been furthered by Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations theory in which he writes that the end of the Cold War opened the way for a "Confucian-Islamic" alliance to fight the dominance of the Western civilisation, a conflict, he adds, has been going on for thirteen hun-

dred years. Huntington predicts that this centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline and could become more virulent.

Throughout the ages on many occasions the Muslim world, faced with external threats, sought strength from within. The Arab League conceived in 1943 and founded two years later, had as primary goals winning independence of all Arab states still under

alien rule and to prevent the Jewish minority in Palestine (then governed by the British) from creating a Jewish state. The Organisation of Islamic States was formed in wake of the Zionist attempt to burn down the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest shrine for Muslims. Neither of these organisations were anti-West, but sought a just peace in the Middle East. One should recall that Arabism, sometimes associated with Islam, had among its founders Christians, and offered an alternative and secular form of cohesion to colonial occupation by the West. Revival of Islamic nationalism was caused by the failure of the Arab rulers to provide the fruits of modernity to its citizens. The rage of the Muslim youth was not so much directed against the West, though it was partly so because the West was seen to shield the corrupt and autocratic rulers, but was against their own rulers who refused to give them a role in the governance of their own countries.

The Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini was not occasioned by deep Muslim rage against Christianity, but was a revolt by ordinary Iranians against the misgovernance by the Shah of Iran, who was reinstated by the CIA. From Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress to Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of multi-polarity, the US attempts till the end of the Cold War were not aimed at promoting democracy in the Third World (to which all the Muslim countries belonged), but to support autocrats and military dictators, who invariably ruled without the consent of their people but acted as a bulwark against communist expansion. This strand of reasoning has been argued by Stephen Zunes (of San Francisco University) who pointed out the skewed nature of US policy towards political Islam. Zunes observes that radical Islamic movements often arise out of legitimate needs and grievances of oppressed sectors of population who see the US as partly responsible for their suffering. He also faults Washington with encouraging the rise of extremist Islamic politics both through short-sighted support of such movements and governments (e.g. Talibans in Afghanistan), and through its support of repressive regimes that often trigger extreme backlash responses.

The current American campaign against Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria, now that Saddam Hussein is gone, has caused disquiet. Despite Saudi efforts to contain the influence of the ultra-conservatives who see Saudi movement towards modernity as a threat to the moral purity of Islamic society, many western analysts continue to portray the Kingdom as a fragmented entity, being in the throes of crisis with rapidly increasing population and declining welfare system, and the Saudi monarchy playing a precarious intermediary role between a westernised elite, impatient to have western political model of governance, and a Wahhabi religious establishment firmly wedded to practice of pristine Islam. Syria is being constantly accused of abet-

ting insurrection in Iraq and threatened through the enactment of Syrian Accountability Act. Iran is being asked to fully account for its nuclear program while the western countries continue with their policy of "nuclear ambiguity" relating to Israeli nuclear arsenal. Besides, the 9/11 Commission's report that, in advance of the attack, eight of the 9/11 hijackers left Afghanistan via Iran fueled speculation about relations between Iran and al-Qaeda. Iran dismissed the allegations as US election propaganda and pointed out that at the height of al-Qaida's involvement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan Iran nearly went to war against its eastern neighbour.

Such dichotomous western policy based on indiscriminate use of the term "Islamic fundamentalism" and its identification with governments and movements have contributed to a sense of a monolithic Islamic menace looming large in the minds of ordinary westerners. Long term western interest would be better served (here Europe has taken a position different from the US) not by opposing ICJ's advisory opinion on Israeli Berlin Wall, for example, but by winning over antagonists through the use of Joseph Nye's "soft power" i.e. the ability to attract others through display of better values, attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. Western powers may also consider ejecting from their policy framework the Christian Right's messianic theology that sees gathering of the Jews to the Holy Land as a precursor to the second coming of Christ and thereby condoning the continued occupation of Palestine. The lessons of the enquiries on both sides of the Atlantic into the tragic events of 9/11 are to co-opt the Islamic world into a cohesive world order through politico-economic engagements so that the al-Qaedists are denied fresh recruits for their war of hatred against universal values of civilisation.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.