Be that as it may, the departure of the symbol of US occupation of Iraq must be a welcome development to any freedom loving Iraqi. Indeed, this is the first step towards regaining Iraqi sovereignty, and, however notional it may be, it should be welcomed by all.

But, now that the symbol has departed, does it change the substance on the ground significantly? Does it mean that Iraq is really sovereign?

Some corollaries to the above are, how much of popular confidence will the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) engender given the nature as well as the circumstances of its birth? How much of UN involvement would be required to sort out the mess resulting from the fourteen months of occupation of Iraq, and last but not the least, how much would the IIG be able to contain the problems that it has inherited from the departing US administrator?

First, it is very important for the IIG to establish its credentials to the Iraqi people. To many Iraqis, the IIG is an un-elected body, headed by an erstwhile CIA operative, most of whose members are unknown quantities. But, what is of consequence here is, how much would this nominated body, lacking the legitimacy to govern, steer clear of US influence in completing the tasks that are so very important for Iraq's political future.

In this context, the issue of security must surely be uppermost in the minds of the interim government, because, much of their credibility depend on establishing an aura of normalcy in Iraq, something that the occupation forces had failed to do. On the other hand the matter of security is so very linked with the state of insurgency in Iraq that the IIG has no option but to face up to it in a very pragmatic manner. While one can debate without end the aims and objectives, the motivations, support and sustenance of the insurgents, the IIG can progress very little towards the final transfer of authority to an elected body of Iraqis, unless the current state of insurgency is brought under control.

While addressing the insurgency situation the IIG would do well to avoid the trap of considering the insurgents as Baathist remnants or supporters of Saddam or al-Qaeda terrorists. The US' characterisation of the insurgents as marginal fragmented elements, bent upon spoiling the handover process, do not stand up to rationale. There are reasons to believe that the insurgents have garnered considerable local support, something that is helping them to operate with relative safety. Targeting the occupation forces and their Iraqi supporters allows them a broadening support base.

But the greatest danger with regard to security is the lack of a credible security force at the disposal of the IIG.

The greatest damage that the US has wrought on the Iraqi nation is the disbanding of the Iraqi security forces. It is much more than mere shortsightedness on the part of the Americans. It exposes their dubious design to make the Iraqis dependent on others, namely the Americans, for their security. Putting up a semblance of a force that can resist the fissiparous elements will be an uphill task for the interim government.

Neil Arun, commenting for the BBC, is of the opinion that, 'many of these problems could have been prevented if Saddam's military had been preserved. The decision to shatter that monolith scattered unemployed gunmen across Iraq, many of them nursing a grudge against the coalition. It also destroyed a ready-made security apparatus of the kind the US is now desperately trying to build.' According to him the occupation forces have so far managed to train only two thirds of the quarter million personnel that is required for the Iraqi security forces. But mere numbers do not portray the reality on ground. Their commitment to fight an well-organised insurgency is also under question. However, the insurgents are not the only armed groups that the interim government has to deal with. There are a large variety of private militias dominating the Iraqi countryside that will create headaches for the IIG.

Much of the IIG's credentials would also depend on its ability to bring about radical improvements in the basic necessitates and infrastructure that seemed to have disappeared along with Saddam. The interim government must also be able to control its oil production and revenues therefrom, and secure the oil pipelines that are so vulnerable to disruptions.

The road to final sovereignty is defined by the two elections that would eventuate in the establishment of the rule of the people finally in Iraq. This is problematical in many ways and one that would require the help and support of the United Nations.

The presence of the coalition forces, with as yet undefined charter of duties, remains the burning question. No nation can be called a truly sovereign state with the continued presence of an occupation force on its territory.

Regrettably, reports suggest that Bremer, in his own ways, have formulated certain rules and regulations, in order to 'tighten the grip on Iraq's Future,' post 30th June. Yochi Dreazen and Christopher Cooper have exposed the devious designs of Bremer in an article in the Wall Street Journal of 13 May 2004. They write, "As Washington prepares to hand over power, U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer and other officials are quietly building institutions that will give the U.S. powerful levers for influencing nearly every important decision the interim government will make. In a series of edicts issued earlier this spring, Mr. Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority created new commissions that effectively take away virtually all of the powers once held by several ministries.... and put in place a pair of watchdog institutions that will serve as checks on individual ministries and allow for continued U.S. oversight." So much for the US handover of Iraqi sovereignty.

One can well understand the constraints of the Interim Authority, but it must also acknowledge the fact that meeting public expectations of its ability to work outside the influence of the US tutelage will be its acid test. Thus, the IIG must be seen, not as an extension of the occupation's arm, but as an independent entity, working outside the orbit of the US occupation force, now euphemistically called the multinational force, thanks to the UN Security Council resolution 1546.

The US military, which has been allowed to continue their presence in Iraq by the said resolution, must keep their hands off both the security and administrative affairs of the Iraqis. The IIG must not only disengage from the US tutelage, it must also act independently and avoid being backseat driven by the Americans.

If the US really wants a sovereign Iraq it should pack its bags from there, sooner rather than later.

The author is, Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.