Assigning a lead role to the UN in overseeing the process to an elected government in Iraq, which the new resolution does, is an acknowledgement of UN's indispensability in Iraq's political dénouement. This is, however, both a vindication as well as a cause for concern for it, according to a high UN official. A vindication, one presumes, of the UN's authority as the sole arbiter of international conflictive issues. The concerns are justifiable. Any UN role in Iraq must be well defined and not be seen to be an instrument for legitimising US actions and continued presence after 30th June, in Iraq.

Concerns for the UN is addressed by inserting a proviso in the draft resolution for a dedicated force for the security of UN establishments that might be in place in Iraq consequent upon the new resolution.

However, in spite of some changes incorporated in the draft resolution insofar as it relates to the new Interim government's full control over Iraqi security forces, it has been viewed with reservations by the other permanent members of the Council and with cynicism by observers. Even Britain and the US have differing views in so far as the proposed Multinational Force (MNF) is concerned.

The major misgiving of the other permanent members is about the proposed MNF on which the draft is deliberately ambiguous. The resolution, "Reaffirms authorization for the multinational force under unified command to maintain security and stability in Iraq and decides to review its mandate in 12 months or at the request of Iraq's transitional government… ". Innocuous as it may appear in print, the draft is silent on the definition of MNF and the meaning of 'unified command' is left to our imagination. What is worrisome is the silence of the proposal on the extent of control of the Iraqi authorities over the MNF.

Those with a modicum of understanding of a multinational force will realise the potential for disaster in a 'unified command'. In any case, one expects a UN authorised force to be representative of the UN and working under the stipulated UN setup. What one discerns between the lines is that the proposed resolution is designed to accord the Occupation Force the new designation of MNF and to allow its functioning as before. However, the issue of exit of the force has been addressed through the recent changes in the Draft.

It need no iteration that a UN force, if at all necessary, must have the consent of the host country, which in this case is Iraq, and must operate within specifics determined by the UN and under the UN flag. How the new dispensation will qualify as a 'UN mission' when in fact the resolution is designed to endorse the continued presence of US troops as a part of a multinational force is difficult to understand.

The scope of operations of the new force is also left ambiguous, further confounded by Mr. Blair blowing hot and cold on the matter. The apprehension that the writ of the Iraqi Interim government would not extend to the MNF is, therefore, justified. In this regard China's proposed amendments to the draft to give "Iraqis the explicit right to decide if the troops should stay and that the Interim government should have a final say regarding extension of the force and on major actions to be taken by it", echoes the concerns of the other four permanent Council members. This has been only partly addressed by specifying the time of exit of the MNF that the British and the Americans have suggested in the changed draft.

Even the language of the draft betrays the psyche of the drafters in that while they suggest a very intimate role of the UN in Iraq's transition to democracy, it makes no mention of the need for consent of the Iraqi government to the proposed arrangements. It is absolutely necessary that the UN is wanted by, rather than imposed upon, a country, even if it happens to be Iraq, a nation defiled, a people subjected to the most degrading and inhuman conditions under illegal occupation.

In reality the draft betrays US desire to retain after 30th June its military occupation of Iraq under a UN umbrella. If Iraq is to be fully sovereign it has to be given absolute authority to determine, without duress, as to what sort of help it wants from the UN or for that matter any other agency. It must be allowed to run its own affairs without any backseat driving. It is the Iraqi government that has the sovereign right to decide if it requires foreign troops for its security, and for how long. Furthermore, such a security force assigned to Iraq under a UN mandate must be a part of the 'Blue Berets' only. Otherwise, it would be only an abridged sovereignty; the term 'UN mission' would lose its meaning and the troop contributing countries would have hesitations in being part of a phalanx that would in fact be comprised largely of the Coalition forces.

Although the Americans and the British have suggested several amendments to the original draft, several clauses in it need to be changed if they want to 'dispel the common perception that the new resolution would not be occupation under another name'.

The author is Editor, Strategic and International Affairs, The Daily Star.