Certain rightwing stalwarts, uniformed and civilians, have used this foreign hand explanation so often that it has become a reflex action for well-connected publicists. And yet a wee bit of thinking will show that Pakistan for all its crime and violence is crawling with sleuths of countless intelligence services. A friend counted 24 and gave up as many seemed to have remained; it is quite impossible for India or even Russia, China, UK, France, Germany and many others to be able to set up terrorist cells of committed fanatics, provide logistical support and mastermind them. One does not include the US intelligence services in the list of those who cannot directly mastermind the destablisation of this country. Why? because the track record of the CIA -- a sort of holdall name for all American secret capabilities -- includes top ranking Pakistani names as its 'men' who, in their turn, can do much. No other country, by itself, can cause upheavals. India certainly cannot find such committed men who would knowingly die doing India's bid. Paid agents do not sacrifice their own lives.

Secondly, let us consider for a moment which countries would like to destabilise Pakistan and if possible to destroy it. If someone is not blinded by hatred, it would be hard to find a country that actually can countenance Pakistan's serious destabilisation. US would be the last country to wish it; it needs Pakistan so much for its various purposes in central Asia. Emotionally, both India and Afghanistan may contain many who hate Pakistan. But no reasonably organised government in India, and also Afghanistan, can wish to harm the state of Pakistan. India badly needs a stable Pakistan for a variety of reasons -- including its utility as a punching bag for political advancement.

Pakistan's own record of conspiracies at the very top, resulting occasionally in murders and usually in dismissals of constitutional Prime Ministers -- including having four glaringly illegal military governments -- suggests strongly an entrenched force that has already given an ugly image to this country: some say it is a failed state and all agree that it has been an unstable state for lack of agreement on the precise identity of a Pakistanis. The ultimate purposes of entrenched ruling elites are in fact unacceptable to a majority of Pakistani. Main among these are: (a) a love of an overly strong centre, (b) opposition to regional nationalism and (c) a fascination for the rhetoric of a basically non-consensual Islamic State.

The point being made is that Pakistan is quite self-sufficient in forces or factors that lead to instability. These contradictions could not be resolved in 56 years, except perhaps one: out of the three major factors one has counted, one contradiction may have been resolved: the military, as an institution, has emerged which has produced absolute kings, four of them already, who concentrated all powers at the centre (or in intervals military has chosen the role of king-makers for itself); all others have been powerless and seem fated to remain so. Other factors remain to play mischief unexpectedly.

But the rise in the last two decades of religious groups has raised the spectre of Militant Islam. They have acquired well-armed militias, thanks to the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Army. Their joint efforts have made them emerge today as 20 per cent of the polity. It is this sore thumb that actually does not like the face of General Musharraf, who has betrayed its darlings: the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The would be killers could only admire and venerate this Islamic leadership. But do not mistake murder attempts as a revolt against military rule as such. They are only after Mr. Musharraf; the Army as such would be acceptable to them.

Mr. Musharraf can be faulted for two mistakes. One, he decided to be the latter day king and is even now hankering after retaining those powers that only kings of yore had. Aslam Beg, Janjua and other COASes had the advantage of having their writs signed on by showpiece PMs; Musharraf had to come out into the exposed position of an anointed king. Secondly when he decided to fight Islamic terror it was only to appease the Americans and the Indians; he did not have his heart in it. Which is why he failed to reorient state policies to be in consonance with the spirit and ethos of the new line he had superficially adopted.

To be specific, Mr. Musharraf should have allowed maximum political space to the two mainstream parties, adequately conservative and Army-loving, so that the clergy should not have had a virtual political vacuum to expand into. It is possible to wonder over how much state aid had MMA received in the last election; most people believe so, and it seems to have been partly corroborated by the Musharraf choice of the MMA as a ruling partner (on Musharraf's terms that the military willingly accepts as the datum line for future civil and military relations). It is significant that Mr. Musharraf has tacitly accepted the politics of MMA as a better option than PPP's or PML(N)'s politics.

It is for thinking Pakistanis to ponder over Mr. Musharraf's preference of MMA over PPP and or PML(N). Everybody knows that MMA mainly comprises JUI in two main factions and Jamaate Islami with many front organisations; the rest have far smaller street or electoral power. Now, it is JI and JUI that provided many Jihadis in both Afghanistan's two consecutive wars and for Kashmir. All others involved in Jihad have some links, emotional or political, with JUI and Jamaat. What MMA will want to do can be guessed.

What PPP and or PML(N) would have done in sharing power with Musharraf, as a possible option that was not exercised, is no mystery. They would have been happy to carry out the line that would have gone down well with Army's officer corps but with one caveat: they would have perhaps insisted on, this time round, non-inclusion of Article 58(2)(B). Perhaps, but one is not sure if they would have made it their criterion, especially if Musharraf had used the bait of allowing safe return of Benazir and or Nawaz Sharif. For all one knows these parties would have repeated the mistake they made in 1985 negotiations with Zia. At any rate, PPP and or PML(N) in office, with or without MMA on board, would have filled the political vacuum to an extent. To that extent MMA's growth would face a dynamic obstacle. Now, thanks to the Musharraf choice, MMA faces relatively less of an obstacle for growth.

Let the country not forget where the Taliban, soul mates of al-Qaeda, came from and who their godfathers were. The country today has many who have voted MMA into what it is. These voters are also those who admire both Taliban and al-Qaeda. The support and help that Taliban and al-Qaeda receive -- which is why they are here in considerable numbers -- is from this gentry. The point is how far can a government effectively and politically fight the threat from Islamic extremism, if it has to keep MMA in good humour all the time?

Doubtless one cannot think of accusing MMA leaders, some of whom likeable, of designs on the life of President Musharraf. But one does think that they have a large number of voters and supporters who range from being coolly indifferent to the fate of Mr.

Musharraf to extreme opponents who will like to take serious risks in removing him from the political stage. If somehow one could ask questions from those two suicide bombers who rammed their pick-ups into the presidential motorcade, it is probable that they would turn out to be voters and supporters of the more extreme Islamic groups.

Mr. Musharraf is personally a brave man. But his definition of bravery seems to suffer from the notions of a young soldier: physically overcoming an opponent and shooting him before he shoots. By politicians and statesmen a different kind of bravery is needed: it is a higher kind of courage in giving up harmful but fond notions and common illusions and accepting new ideas that will rid the society of various dangerous and harmful notions while winning over common people's hearts and minds. No trickery or political gimmicks are required that generally boomerang. It requires adopting a politics that will, over time, change common ideas and preferences of the citizenry or at least a substantial part of society by normal democratic processes. No short cuts, please.

Situated as Mr. Musharraf is, he still has options. Only moral courage is required to adopt a different purpose from that of a coup making general. Let him start worrying about a Pakistan he will leave for posterity, no matter when or how he leaves the scene. That is how the conversion of a squalid politician into a statesman begins. He should aim at building an ordinary -- without any adjective --democracy and hand over power to elected representatives (whoever they are) that emerge from an early and fair election. Let him ensure two things: the special constitutional provisions he has now forced on the present flawed National Assembly need being withdrawn and secondly intelligence services are asked not to go anywhere near the electoral processes. Pakistan needs a democracy that is understood as such in Europe, UK or US; nothing more and nothing less.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.